Maine Law Review
Volume 59

Number 1

Article 3

January 2007

Alexis de Tocqueville and American Constitutional Law: On
Democracy, the Majority Will, Individual Rights, Federalism,
Religion, Civic Associations and Originalist Constitutional Theory
Philip C. Kissam

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Law and Philosophy Commons, and the Law and Society
Commons

Recommended Citation
Philip C. Kissam, Alexis de Tocqueville and American Constitutional Law: On Democracy, the Majority Will,
Individual Rights, Federalism, Religion, Civic Associations and Originalist Constitutional Theory, 59 Me. L.
Rev. 35 (2007).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr/vol59/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Maine School of Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Maine Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Maine
School of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact mdecrow@maine.edu.

ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE AND AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: ON DEMOCRACY, THE
MAJORITY WILL, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS,
FEDERALISM, RELIGION, CIVIC ASSOCIATIONS,
AND ORIGINALIST CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
Philip C. Kissam
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.

WHY MODERNS CONSULT THE ANCIENTS
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE'S PROJECT
DEMOCRACY, THE MAJORITY WILL, AND RIGHTS
DEMOCRACY AND FEDERALISM
DEMOCRACY AND RELIGION
DEMOCRACY AND CIVIC ASSOCIATIONS
DEMOCRACY AND ORIGINALIST CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY

HeinOnline -- 59 Me. L. Rev. 35 2007

MAINE LAW REVIEW

36

[Vol. 59:1

ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE AND AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: ON DEMOCRACY, THE
MAJORITY WILL, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS,
FEDERALISM, RELIGION, CIVIC ASSOCIATIONS
AND ORIGINALIST CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
Philip C. Kissam·
Count Alexis de Tocqueville's Democracy in America• has been said to be "at
once the best book ever written on democracy and the best book ever written on
America. " 2 This praise should perhaps be tempered by consideration of Tocqueville' s
purposes and the historical circumstances within which he worked and understood both
democracy and America. 3 Yet Tocqueville's insights into American democracy as of
the 1830s undoubtedly constitute a rich source of constitutional thought-either as
support for particular constitutional principles or as constitutional ideas that should be
contested. 4 In a recent notable instance, John McGinnis has argued that Tocqueville's
ideas about democracy, especially his views that decentralization and diffuse
government and civic or voluntary associations can create valuable social norms,
provide a persuasive and coherent justification for the conservative jurisprudence of
the Rehnquist Court. 5 McGinnis argues that the Rehnquist Court's "revival of
federalism, "6 its expansion of freedom of expression rights for organizations like the
Boy Scouts,7 and its expanded protection for religious expression in the public sphere 8

* Late Professor of Law, University of Kansas. My thanks to Ed Browne and Andrew Marino for
their excellent research assistance and to my colleagues Ray Davis, Jonathan Earle, Mike Kautsch, Rick
Levy, Phil Paludan, and Tom Stacy for their many helpful comments and suggestions on this project.
I. ALEXISDE TOCQUEVILLE,
DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA(Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba Winthrop,
trans., University of Chicago Press 2000) ( 1835).
2. Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba Winthrop, Editor's Introduction to ALEXISDE TOCQUEVILLE,
DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA
at xvii, xvii (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba Winthrop, trans., University of
Chicago Press 2000) (1835).
3. See SHELDON
s.WOLIN,TOCQUEVILLE
BETWEEN
Two WORLDS:
THEMAKING OFAPOLITICAL
AND
THEORETICAL
LIFE(2001) (arguing that Tocqueville created an idealized picture of democracy in America
that would dramatize salient features for the purpose of persuading nineteenth century European politicians
that democratic forms of government were inevitable and should be accepted with modifications); see also
Gary Wills, Did Tocqueville "Get" America?, N.Y. REV.Bom~s, Apr. 29, 2004, at 52 ("Some people are
astonished that a twenty-six-year-oldFrenchman ... could write the best book on America, after a brief visit
to the country. I am astonished that anyone can think that he did.").
4. See, e.g., Harvey C. Mansfield, Tocqueville and the Future of American Constitutionalism, in THE
NORMATIVE
CONSTITUTION:
ESSAYSFORTHE THIRDCENTURY45 (Richard Sherlock, Kent E. Robson &
Charles W. Johnson, eds., 1995); Bruce Frohnen, Tocqueville's Law: Integrative Jurisprudence in the
American Context, 39 AM. J. JURIS.241 (1994); Randall Kennedy, Tocqueville and Racial Conflict in
America: A Comment, 11 HARV.BLACKLETIER
L.J. 145 (1994); John 0. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville 's
America: The Rehnquist Court's Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CAL.L. REV.485 (2002).
5. See McGinnis, supra note 4.
6. Id. at 51I.
7. Id. at531-38.
8. Id. at 543-59.
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follow Tocqueville's prescriptions for democracy and have enhanced the spontaneous
ordering of society through the promotion of diffuse, localized social nonns. 9
McGinnis also argues that the "fundamental rights" 10 jurisprudence of the modem
Supreme Court, particularly the privacy rights doctrine, constitutes the judicial
declaration of national norms that are antithetical to Tocquevillian democracy. 11
The purpose of this essay is to explore the relevance ofTocqueville's theory of
democracy to contemporary constitutional law. The brilliance of Tocqueville's
insights and his position as a detached observer, as a matter of nationality, geography,
and time, suggest that Tocqueville's viewpoint on American democracy should
constitute a good basis from which to raise theoretical questions and arguments about
American constitutional law, as it is and as it should be.
Unlike most writing on Tocqueville and the law, this essay emphasizes not only
Tocqueville's celebration of American democracy as of the I 830s but also his motives
for writing, the contradictions within his work and between his analysis and historical
circumstances, and the darker sides of his thought about democratic tendencies. This
essay thus contests the recent writing on Tocqueville and constitutional law that lifts
his optimistic ideas and concepts about American democracy out of context in order
to support a conservative jurisprudence of the kind favored by the Rehnquist Court. 12
This essay in contrast reveals good reasons for questioning, qualifying, and reconstructing Tocquevillian concepts of democratic government if these concepts are to
help us develop a useful and attractive constitutional law for the twenty-first century.
When viewed in the context of the full text of Democracy in America, the
historical circumstances within which Tocqueville worked, and the subsequent
changing circumstances in American history, Tocqueville's views on democracy tend
to support the basic principles of modem constitutional law and the interpretive
methodology that supports them much more than they support the originalist or
revisionist versions of constitutional law that are being advanced by members of the
Rehnquist Court and scholars like John McGinnis. Upon a full contextual
examination, Tocqueville's ideas justify a constitutional law that aims to promote an
"equality of conditions" 13 in American democracy. His ideas justify a robust
protection of individual rights against the majority will when legislative majorities act
on the basis of mere passion and majority opinion to coerce conformity and to
disadvantage persons of difference. His ideas also justify judicial recognition of strong
national government powers when national actions, by the legislature, executive, or
judiciary, are appropriate to address economic and social problems because
Tocqueville's view of the advantages offederalism and decentralization are grounded
in the subsidiarity principle-that government should be decentralized to its most
effective level-rather than in some notion of fixed constitutional thought that stems
from the eighteenth century. Tocqueville also recommended the use of interpretive
methods in constitutional law that take account of historical contingencies and

9. Id at 565-71.
10. Id at 565.
11. See id.
12. See, e.g., Mansfield, supra note 4; Frohnen, supra note 4; McGinnis, supra note 4; Jock Yellott,
Tocqueville, Judge Hand, and the American Legal Mind, 38 S.D. L. REV. 100 (1993).
13. See TOQUEVILLE,
supra note I, at 12-13.
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changing circumstances-unlike originalist constitutional theory and its purportedly
more rigid interpretive method.
This essay is organized as follows. The first two parts provide contextual
background. Part I discusses why "we modems" might be attracted to ''the ancients"
for help in constructing our political and legal theories. Part II describes Alexis de
Tocqueville's general project, his purposes in writing Democracy in America, and the
limitations entailed by his project. The succeeding parts then examine the relevance
ofTocqueville's ideas to modem constitutional law. Part III considers Tocqueville's
conceptions of democracy, the majority will, and individual constitutional rights. Part
IV explores his views on federalism and decentralized government. Part V looks at
Tocqueville's discussion ofreligion and its special importance to democracy. Part VI
considers his theory of how civic associations are important to democracy and the
relevance of this principle to contemporary constitutional law. Part VII examines the
relevance ofTocqueville's analysis of democracy and law to originalist constitutional
theory.
I. WHY MODERNS CONSULT THE ANCIENTS

14

Why do we modems appeal to ancient writers to help address political and legal
issues? There are several reasons for this, but we should start by recognizing two
fundamentally different though overlapping perspectives that are engaged in this
process. First, one may have intellectual motives to discover how the ancients,
especially writers who have obtained a revered status, addressed their political
problems, not only as a matter of historical knowledge but also as a matter of understanding the flow and disruptions of historical developments and as a basis for a
comparative analysis of political problems and solutions. But secondly, one may
also-or in the altemative--have political motives to find some sort of persuasive
authority or persuasive rhetoric that can support a political position to which a modem
person is committed. This political perspective of course is the one likely to dominate
the work of lawyers and law professors when they appeal to ancient writers on
American politics and law, for intellectual workers in law typically engage in resultoriented rather than open-ended inquiry. For example, consider the attraction that
members of the Federalist Society and other strict originalist theorists appear to have
for pithy statements by James Madison and other Founders that seem to support claims
of a Second Amendment individual right to guns, 15 a very restricted reading of the

I 4. In this article I use the term "ancients" to refer to early writers about American democracy and
constitutionalism, including both Founders and outside observers such as Tocqueville.
15. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett & Don B. Kates, Under Fire: The New Consensus on the Second
Amendment, 45 EMORYL.J. I 139, 1208 (1996) (quoting Alexander Hamilton on the meaning of "a wellregulated militia"); William C. Plouffe, Jr., A Federal Court Holds the Second Amendment an Individual
Right: Jeffersonian Utopia or Apocalypse Now?, 30 U. MEM.L. REV. 55, 14-15 (1999) (quoting Benjamin
Franklin on the meaning of"militia"). But cf Jack N. Rakove, The Second Amendment: The Highest Stage
of Originalism, 16 CHI.-KENTL. REv. 103 (2000) (describing the more complex context and set of
constitutional provisions that bear on the meaning of the Second Amendment and suggest contrary
arguments which oppose the individual right to guns).
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Commerce power of Congress, 16or the constitutionality of religiously-based government.17 As we examine the specific reasons for consulting the ancients on American
government and the Constitution, we should keep in mind these perspectives and the
possibility that investigators (including the present one) may often shift, at times
imperceptibly, between these perspectives.
Several reasons to appeal to ancient writers on American government like James
Madison and Alexis de Tocqueville can be associated with originalist constitutional
theory, for originalist theory is aided by any persuasive evidence that helps establish
an original meaning for an abstract term in the constitutional text or the value of such
meanings. Tocqueville of course was neither a Framer of the Constitution nor writing
about the original understanding of the text's meaning in late eighteenth century
America. But his analysis of how American society and government had developed
during the first forty years of its constitutional government was written close enough
in time to the adoption of the United States Constitution to arguably provide both (1)
some indirect evidence of original meanings, and (2) more importantly, a kind of
feedback evidence about the good consequences of the original Constitution and its
original meanings. Thus, it seems natural that Tocqueville's writing about democracy
in America would appeal to originalist theorists, although perhaps different originalists
will have different reasons.
First, those who believe in timeless truths about human nature or government or
in the need for some kind of fixed authority for constitutional law may find comforting
evidence of such truths or authority when they find it in the writings of revered ancient
writers. While originalists need not or may not believe in many such truths, one
timeless truth they do seem to believe in is the notion that law can be law only if it has
an objective source and meaning on which everyone can agree by applying the same
interpretive methodology to the abstract provisions of the constitutional text and their
diffuse contexts. 18This view, in tum, engenders searches for original meanings of the
constitutional text as either a matter of linguistic analysis, 19 Framers' intent, 20 or "the
original understanding" 21 of constitutional provisions among the American public. In
this approach, the objective determination of the original meaning ofa constitutional
text becomes dispositive of constitutional meaning. Arguments from precedents and
principles of constitutional law that are not supported by or consistent with original
meaning do not count-and these arguments are dismissed as the illegitimate

16. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 586-89 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting
Alexander Hamilton on the distinction between commerce, manufacturing and agriculture).
17. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffiee, 472 U.S. 38, 97-98 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting James
Madison on the establishment ofa national religion). But see Douglas Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to
Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARYL. REV. 875 (1986) (refuting Justice
Rehnquist's argument in Wallace v. Jajfree).
18. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1
(1971); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989). For a contrary view
about how contested legal and constitutional meanings are constructed from different interpretive
perspectives, see RONALDDWORKIN,LAW'S EMPIRE(1986).
(1997).
19. See, e.g., ANTONINSCALIA,A MAITER OF INTERPRETATION
20. See, e.g., RAOULBERGER,GoVERNMENTBY JUDICIARY( 1977); Bork, supra note I 8.
21. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 584 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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imposition of judicial values upon democracy that is essentially identified with current
legislative majorities. 22
A second reason for constitutional theorists to consult the ancients is to search for
a more limited but spiritually deeper "ancestral originalism" 23 or, in other words, ideas
and practices endorsed by the ancients that constitute partial and important evidence
offundamental traditions in American history that have continued over time to inform
constitutional values and practices. 24 Thus, for example, what the Framers said about
guns and the Second Amendment may not be good evidence of constitutional ancestral
originalism, for the Second Amendment has not been applied in a consistent fashion
by the courts to protect a constitutional right to guns against federal or state
regulations. 25 On the other hand, what James Madison said in Federalist Number 10
about the role of factions in constitutional government, or what Alexander Hamilton
said in Federalist Number 78 about the necessity for the power of judicial review, are
arguably parts of our enduring constitutional traditions. These latter ideas deserve
consideration in constitutional argument, not as dispositive arguments like strict
originalist arguments, but as important principles that should be taken into account in
any situation to which they are relevant.
A third reason for constitutional theorists to consult the ancients would be to
search for arguments from "heroic originalism" 26 or, in other words, arguments from
the wisdom of the Founding Fathers or other revered constitutional commentators like
Thomas Jefferson who generally are thought to have been masterful political
theorists. 27 James Madison's ideas about the play of political factions in republican
government, Alexander Hamilton's views about the power of judicial review, or (for
some) even the Framers' statements about guns may qualify as arguments for heroic
originalism that deserve weight because of the political genius of these Framers and
their particular ideas. As with ancestral originalism, these arguments need not be
dispositive but are good arguments that should be taken into account. The basic point
about both ancestral and heroic originalism is that these arguments are more limited
in nature and less dispositive than originalist arguments of the "timeless truth" type
that are intended to establish a fixed quality to constitutional law.
There are significant non-originalist reasons for consulting the ancients as well.
One is the pragmatic Burkean notion that any successful organization should remain
cognizant of and stay relatively close to its original principles to ensure that what
worked for its initial growth and goodness remains a standard for advantageous
operations. In commenting on how republics could ensure themselves a long
existence, Niccolo Machiavelli put it this way:

22. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 18.
23. Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Nonnative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of
Original Meaning, 8S GEO.L.J. 176S, 180 I ( 1997).
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF 1lffi
24. Id. at 1800-03, 1806-16. Cf PIDLIP Boeem,
CONSTITUTION 93-167 (1982) (describing a form of constitutional argument from the American
"constitutional ethos" that does not require but cenainly can be enhanced in particular cases by arguments
from "ancestral originalism").
25. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, What Does the Second Amendment Mean Today?, 76 Cm.-KENTL. REV.
291,319 (2000).
26. Dorf, supra note 23, at 1803.
27. See id at 1803-16.
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There is nothing more true than that all the things of this world have a limit to their
existence; but those only run the entire course ... that do not allow their body to
become disorganized, but keep it unchanged in the manner ordained, or if they
change it, so do it that it shall be for their advantage, and not to their injury ... And
those are the best constituted bodies, and have the longest existence, which possess
the intrinsic means of frequently renewing themselves, or such as obtain this
renovation in consequence of some extrinsic accidents ... [A]nd the means of
renewing them is to bring them back to their original principles. 28

Original principles can thus serve as a standard for pragmatic gradual Burkean
change-in effect by requiring that all changes be justified by reasoning about the
appropriateness of departing from original principles in order to accommodate
government to changing historical circumstances.
A second non-originalist reason to consult the ancients is the more radical one of
contrasting contemporary thought with ancient thought in order to develop a case for
the advantages of contemporary thought. This approach focuses upon the flaws or
weaknesses in ancient thought that can become part of a case for doing things
differently. For example, Benjamin Constant, the nineteenth-century French liberal
and a contemporary ofTocqueville 's, believed it was important to contrast the "ancient
freedoms" of positive liberty to participate in government, as in Athenian democracy,
with the "modem freedoms" of negative liberty or individual rights against state
regulations in order to promote the cause ofliberalism. 29
More generally, consulting the ancients like Alexis de Tocqueville can provide a
sense of detachment from the pressures and passions of immediate political struggles,
· and thus give us an opportunity or excuse to withdraw somewhat from the struggle and
reflect dispassionately upon the wisdom of contemporary policy choices. In sum, the
non-originalist reasons for consulting the ancients each involve incorporating older
political ideas into a kind of comparative political or legal analysis of contemporary
issues in order to help determine what should be done. 30
A final preliminary point should be noted. Whatever the reasons for consulting
ancient writers like Tocqueville or James Madison, the investigation of ancient texts
typically discloses historical contingencies that surrounded and influenced the writing
of these texts as well as complicated intratextual conditions that are embedded in the
texts. 31 These kinds ofhistorical and ideological circumstances ought to figure in any

28. NICCOLO
MACHIAVELLI,
The Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livi us, in THEPRINCEAND
THEDISCOURSES
99, 397 (Modem Library College ed., Chistian E. Detrnold trans., 1950).
29. See BENJAMIN
CONSTANT,
Principles of Politics Applicable to All Representative Governments, in
POLITICAL
WRITINGS170 (Biancamaria Fontana ed., 1988); Mansfield & Winthrop, supra note 2, at xxv;
WOLIN,supra note 3, at 208, 413-14.
30. Cf. DAVIDP. CURRIE,THECONSTITUTION
IN CONGRESS:
THEJEFFERSONIANS,
1801-29 (2000)),
reviewed in Martin S. Flaherty, Post-Originalism, 68 U. CHI.L. REV. 1089, 1107-10 (2001) (describing an
"experiential alternative" that would make use of constitutional history in constitutional argument by
assessing historical ideas for their relative values and weaknesses).
31. See generally Rakove, supra note 15 (describing the textual provisions of the constitution and
. historical context that speak to the meaning of the Second Amendment and the claimed individual right to
guns).
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analysis ofTocqueville's ideas about democracy and constitutional law, and the next
part of this essay begins this examination.

II. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE'SPROJECT
Count Alexis de Tocqueville, a young French .civil servant judge, toured the
United States for nine months in 1831 and early 1832 with his colleague, another
young civil servant judge, Gustave de Beaumont. 32 Their ostensible or official
purpose, for which they obtained leave from the French civil service, was to study
American prison reforms, especially the somewhat different reforms ofNew York and
Philadelphia prisons. 33 But Tocqueville, raised in an aristocratic family and becoming
engaged in French politics as a liberal committed to individual rights, seems to have
burned with ambition to make his political mark in France by discovering and writing
about the new American society and republican government in ways that would
influence French and, more broadly, European politics, and also promote his political
career. 34 In considering Tocqueville's project, then, we should keep in mind three
aspects of its origins: Tocqueville's aristocratic background, which included family
losses and other setbacks from both the French Revolution and Napoleon's
government, 35 his growing commitment to nineteenth century liberalism and individual
rights, 36 and his desire to write about America in striking and politically useful ways
that would develop and promote his political views and ambitions. 37
Tocqueville's method for examining and understanding America seems based
upon his desire "to get beneath the surface" 38 or, in .Sheldon Wolin's perspective, to
develop a theory of republican government and democracy that would influence
political developments in Europe after the French Revolution, Napoleon's reign, and
the conservative and liberal reactions that had set in across Europe after 1815.39 But

32. See GEORGEWILSONPIERSON,TOQUEVILLE
IN AMERICA10, 30-31 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press
1996) (1938).
33. See id. at 27-33. American prison reforms in the early nineteenth century featured large-scale
asylums designed to rehabilitate prisoners by isolating them from society and its influences. New York
asylums provided for communal work by prisoners during the day, although prisoners were not allowed to
talk with each other (and silence seems to have been maintained "by the whip") while Philadelphia's
asylums kept prisoners isolated from each other all the time. See id at 94-100.
34. See Gordon Wood, Tocquevil/e's Lesson, N.Y. REV.OF BOOKS,May 17, 2001, at 46-47. See
generally WOLIN,supra note 3.
35. Tocqueville's maternal great grandfather, Malesherbes, defended Louis XVI at his trial, and five
of his relatives were guillotined during the Republican Terror. Toqueville's father, Comte Herve de
Tocqueville, and his wife were imprisoned during the Terror and only saved from the guillotine by the fall
of Robespierre. Thereafter, Herve de Tocqueville's wife suffered from nervous breakdowns and the Count
obtained important government service only after the fall of Napoleon in 1814. Tocqueville, born in 1805,
thus had family reasons to be skeptical about modem centralized government power and the democratic
passions that propelled the French Revolution. See Mansfield & Winthrop, supra note 2, at xix-xx;
supra note 32, at 14-18.
PIERSON,
36. See Mansfield & Winthrop, supra note 2, at xx-xxi.
supra note 32, at 31; WOLIN,supra note 3, at I 02-31.
37. See PIERSON,
supra note 32, at 79. See also id at 32 ('"We are leaving,' wrote Tocqueville, 'with the
38. PIERSON,
intention of examining, in detail and as scientifically as possible, all the mechanism . . . of that vast
American society which every one talks of and no one knows."').
39. See WOLIN,supra note 3.
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any good theory must abstract from its context and idealize salient aspects of the
subject, perhaps in Tocqueville's case even to the extent of presenting a utopian
picture of democracy in America that would impress European politicians and readers
and make them notice Tocqueville's political ideas as well as Tocqueville himself. 40
This basic purpose or perspective of Tocqueville provides an important reason to be
cautious in assessing his claims about the operations of democracy in America in the
1830s, let alone the twenty-first century. Idealized theorizing may be good for
political theory and good for European politics in the nineteenth century, but it also
may consciously leave out, discount, or simply miss important aspects of American
society and government in the 1830s.
Another reason for bringing caution and skepticism to Tocqueville' s claims comes
from the nature of his and Beaumont's travels in the United States, the kinds of people
they met and were impressed by, and other sources of information they relied upon.
To be sure, Tocqueville and Beaumont departed from the usual ''tourist circuit" for
Europeans who visited the United States in the first half of the nineteenth century. In
their efforts to understand America and "get beneath the surface," 41 they traveled by
stagecoach through the great woods of New York from Albany to Buffalo, visiting
isolated farms, farmers and other inhabitants, including Indians who resided in the
wilderness of Michigan Territory, as well as traveling to smaller undeveloped cities
in the interior. 42 In addition, they explored the leading cities on the coasts, and the
interior of the United States via steamboats on the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers to get
to New Orleans, eventually returning to Washington D.C. by stagecoach through
Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia and the two Carolinas. 43 Nevertheless, Tocqueville and
Beaumont were members of French society, or its elite, and they were heavily
entertained and much enjoyed their entertainments in the United States by leading
members of American society, or its elite. 44 Much of their information and ideas about
society and government in America came from their discussions with and observations
of members of the American elite or its ruling classes, whether the subject was the
operations of government, religion, lawyers, or the effects of democratic government
on society. 45 Another important source on law and government in America for
Tocqueville, as he wrote Democracy in America after his return to France, were the
treatises of New York's Chancellor James Kent and Supreme Court Justice Joseph
Story, especially Story's Constitutional Commentaries. 46 Kent and Story were of
course distinguished commentators on American law, but they were also conservative

40. See id. at 165-66, 363.
41. PIERSON,
supra note 32, at 79.
42. Id (including Detroit, Cincinnati, and Memphis).
43. See generally PIERSON,
supra note 32.
44. See, e.g., id. at 84-92 (in New York City), 362-72 (in Boston).
45. See, e.g., id at 390-425 (detailing conversations with Bostonian religious leaders and politicians,
includingformer President John Quincy Adams, about the operations of state and national government, law
and politics, and local government-specially the importance of the New England township, religion, and
slavery in America).
46. For a discussionon the influence of Kent on Toqueville, see PIERSON,
supra note 32, at 602-07 and
. JAMES
T. SCHLEIFER,
THEMAKINGOFTOCQUEVILLE'SDEMOCRACYINAMERICA
100-01 (Liberty Fund 2000)
(1980). For a discussion on Story, see PIERSON,
supra note 32, at 727, 732 and SCHLEIFER,
supra, at 122,
129-3 I.
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jurists who believed that law should be an important constraint upon democratic
legislative decisions and democratic excesses.47 Thus, at a time when new economic
markets and the politics of Jacksonian democracy were transforming the American
political economy, class structure and culture,48 Tocqueville and Beaumont were
obtaining their primary information about democracy in America from those who were
benefiting a great deal from American markets and who tended to be skeptical at best
about the ideas of popular democracy promoted by Andrew Jackson and his
democratic movement. 49 As we shall see, Tocqueville's ideas about economics and
democratic politics in America tended to follow the views of his primary sources, and
this is another reason to be cautious or skeptical of his views.
With these caveats, let us consider now the structure, main arguments, and key
findings or assertions in Tocqueville's theory about democracy in America. A
significant theoretical contri_butionofTocqueville's was to perceive democracy as a
social movement rather than as merely a form of government. 50 This sociological
approach in Democracy in America was established by Tocqueville's basic premise
that the strongest determinants of the way government and law work within a society
are the "social state" 51 or primary facts of the society or, in other words, its
fundamental mores and habits. The social state of America, Tocqueville claims on the
very first page of Democracy in America, incorporates an "equality of conditions" 52
among its people, or at least among its white males, that exerts an "enormous influence
on the course of society." 53 It was this equality of conditions, in Tocqueville's view,

LAW:A STUDYIN
CONSTITUTIONAL
JOSEPHSTORYANDAMERICAN
47. See, e.g., JAMESMCCLELLAN,
COURTJUSTICEJOSEPHSTORY:
(1971); R. KENTNEWMYER,SUPREME
ANDLEGALTHOUGHT
POLITICAL
( 1985).
OFTHE OLDREPUBLIC
STATESMAN
AMERICA1815-1846 (1991);
JACKSONIAN
48. See CHARLESSELLERS,THE MARKETREVOLUTION:
(1990); ROBERTH.
AMERICA
OF JACKSONIAN
HARRYL. WATSON,LIBERTYAND POWER:THE POLITICS
TOTHE EVE OF
FROMTHE ADoPTIONOFTHE CONSTITUTION
SOCIETY:
OFAMERICAN
WIEBE,THEOPENING
(1984).
DISUNION
supra note 32, at 367 (noting Rev. Jared Spark's comment on Andrew Jackson
49. See, e.g., PIERSON,
"that General Jackson is not made to fill the office of President; his lack of experience in matters relating
to civil government, and his great age, render him incapable ofit.").
657, 657-78
PHILOSOPHY
OFPOLITICAL
50. See Marvin Zetterbaum, Alexis de Tocqueville, in HISTORY
(Leo Strauss & Joseph Cropsey, eds., 1963); see also WOLIN,supra note 3 (arguing that Tocqueville's
distinctive contribution to political theory lay in his analysis of political cultures as well as the forms of
government).
supra note 1, at 45.
51. TOCQUEVILLE,
52. Id. at 3.
53. Id. Tocqueville goes on to say:
[T]his primary fact ... gives a certain direction to public spirit, a certain tum to the laws,
new maxims to those who govern, and particular habits to the governed.
Soon I recognized that this same fact extends its influence well beyond political mores
and laws, and that it gains no less dominion over civil society than over government: it
creates opinions, gives birth to sentiments, suggests usages, and modifies everything it does
not produce.
So, therefore, as I studied American society, more and more I saw in equality of
conditions the generative fact from which each particular fact seemed to issue, and I found
it before me constantly as a central point at which all my observations came to an end.
Id.
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that had produced or enhanced the particular democratic practices in the United States,
including those that he praised and those that concerned him a great deal.
The primary fact or concept of the equality of conditions in America is stated,
however, only in an abstract or general way, and this finding or concept of
Tocqueville's seems to be based upon similarly general claims and observations about
the material security of all Americans: a proportionate distribution of material
resources among white males (at least by comparison to resource distributions in
Europe); an openness and availability of resources on the American frontier for those
who currently lack resources; an asserted equality in manners or relationships among
persons both rich and poor; an apparent widespread intellectual attitude 9f
independence and individualism; and-significantly-an
attitude among Americans
about the equal importance of each person, at least in the sense of the equal importance
of their opinions. 54 But whatever its precise contours, this equality of conditions in
Tocqueville's view was substantially strengthening the democratic forms of
government in the United States and in turn was being strengthened by these
forms-in particular by the frequent cooperative participation of individuals in local
government work, jury service, and localized civic associations including churches. 55
Tocqueville's primary concept of the equality of conditions is not only roughly
defined but also idealizes America of the 1830s in two distinct ways. First,
Tocqueville recognized that African-Americans, Native Americans and women did not
share in this equality of conditions, and yet, while critical of these exclusions, he
accepted them in general and did not let them much affect his analysis of democratic
government. 56 Second, Tocqueville in Democracy paid little attention to the growing
economic inequalities in America during the 1820s, the development of the urban poor
and working classes, and their quite limited social mobility. 57 He recognized in a short
passage the possibility that an industrial aristocracy could become sufficiently
powerful to bring about a "permanent inequality of conditions" 58 that would produce
a class of poor and degraded workers with but "few means of leaving their
condition. " 59 But Tocqueville viewed the state of industrial aristocracy in America in
the 1830s, perhaps understandably, as "an exception, a monster, in the entirety of the
social state" 60 and also as "one of the most restrained and least dangerous" 61 of all
aristocracies. With this characterization, economic and social inequalities essentially
disappeared from Tocqueville's picture of democracy in America.

54. See id. at 45-53; Zetterbaum, supra note SO, at 658-60.
55. See TOCQUEVILLE,supra note I, at 3, 56-75, 258-64, 485-500.
56. Tocqueville recognized that slavery might be a future problem for the Union, and he seemed to
believe that married women's acceptance of their "separate sphere" and subordinate role to husbands was
actually a strength of American democracy. But beyond that he contented himself with describing these
three inequalities. See id. at 302-79, 573- 76; Kennedy, supra note 4.
57. See SELLERS,supra note 48, at 238-39; Sean Wilentz, Many Democracies: On Tocqueville and
Jacksonian America, in RECONSIDERINGTOCQUEVILLE'SDEMOCRACYIN AMERICA 207 (Abraham S.
Eisenstadt ed., 1988).
58. TOCQUEVILLE,
supra note I, at 532.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 531.
6 I. Id. at 532.
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The concepts of individualism and materialism are two other significant concepts
that help structure Tocqueville's views of the American social state and democracy.
Individualism, which tends to isolate individuals from each other (something that
Tocqueville worries about), reinforces the equality of conditions by supporting the idea
that everyone's opinion is or should be of equal importance. 62 Paradoxically, though,
individualism also created uncertainty among Americans about what is true or what
is right unless their opinions were aligned with the majority opinion in society, and this
uncertainty and desire for conformity contributed in Tocqueville's view to a mild
despotism that can take hold of the majority will in American culture and politics or
more generally in democracies. 63 But in the 1830s, Tocqueville thought that
Americans had successfully restrained any destructive excessive individualism by
providing for the "local freedoms" 64 of cooperative participation in both local
government and many civic associations. 65 One wonders whether the same could be
said today about the effects of excessive individualism in the context of our much
changed local governments and civic associations in the United States. 66
Tocqueville also observed that the widespread pursuit of material wealth by
Americans, which takes place mostly in the marketplace on an individual basis, helps
to explain both the apparent prosperity of the American economy and the substantial
American desires for low tax and low regulation governments. 67 But he worried about
the tendency of democracy, or the equality of conditions in which all persons tend to
follow majority paths, to favor ''the taste for material enjoyments',68 to such an excess
that materialism could destroy the soul and limit the possibilities for a satisfactory
spiritual life. 69 This tendency did not appear problematic in the America of the 1830s,
but Tocqueville never offered a confident resolution of this possible contradiction
other than to hope that at least in Europe the traditions of aristocracy and centralized
governments might maintain some kind of appropriate balance between the nobility
of great acts that aristocracies made possible and the mundane qualities of democratic
life. 70
Several other key findings help structure Tocqueville's view of democracy in
America. Three such findings relate to his claim, or observation, that American

See id at 479-88.
See id. at 485-86, 661-65.
Id at 487.
See id at 486-87.
On what many local governments can do today to promote rather than restrain excessive
individualism, see generally Richard Schragger, Consuming Government, IOI MICH.L. REv. 1824 (2003)
(reviewing WILLIAM
A. FISCHEL,
THEHOMEVOTER
HYPOTHESIS:
How HOMEVALUESINFLUENCE
LocAL
GoVERNMENT TAXATION,
SCHOOL
FINANCE,
AND LANDUSEPOLICIES
(200 I)); and on the changing nature
of civic associations from the small, diffuse associations of Tocqueville's time to today's much larger
management-oriented organizations, see generally THEDASKOCPOL,DIMINISHED
DEMOCRACY:
FROM
MEMBERSHIP
TO MANAGEMENT
IN AMERICAN
CMC LIFE(2003); see also Part VI infra for further
discussion of this issue.
61. See TOCQUEVILLE,
supra note I, at 199-206 (discussing the desires for low tax governments in a
growing middle class democracy);See also id at 507-10 (discussing materialism and its beneficial economic
effects).
68. Id at 519.
69. See id. at 519-20.
70. See id at 599-604, 673-76.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
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democratic government is a very limited kind of government, especially in tenns of
centralized regulations adopted by either national or state governments. First, he
observed that by the 1830s, Americans had developed a strong, historically-driven
reliance upon local governments to accomplish public tasks, with the New England
township featured as the paradigm and main evidence of this practice. 71 This reliance
on local government had encouraged the equality of conditions and other democratic
values among the populace, who could contribute most actively and most equally to
their local governments. 72 Importantly, this reliance had also produced a division of
responsibilities between "government," or legislation, and "administration," or the
execution of the laws; the former responsibility resided largely with state governments
. and the latter responsibility, including the administration of state laws, had been
delegated to township and county governments. 73 Thus, at the local level, citizens
could participate in government in important ways by selecting and holding
accountable local public officials with responsibility for administering most state laws,
and Tocqueville's praise of decentralized government in American democracy focuses
substantially upon local governments, not states.
Second, Tocqueville actually says very little about state governments, and he
seems in general to view them as relatively unstable and limited governments.
Shifting majorities of voters and legislators tend to change laws and expenditure
patterns abruptly; outstanding leaders are discouraged from seeking public offices in
an atmosphere of equality; and over confidence in the power of the majority, which
assumes the majority's control over public officials, too often leaves public officials
unsupervised in their actions. The major role of state governments, in Tocqueville's
account, seems to have been to pass legislation concerning the operation of local
governments and other laws (for instance criminal laws) that were to be administered
by local governments. 74 State governments at the time were not much engaged in
direct economic regulations although they were heavily involved in the complex,
contentious (and unstable) politics of internal development, constructing turnpikes,
canals and banking systems. 75 Tocqueville only alluded generally to the complexity
of state issues in the 1830s, although he certainly viewed the states as an integral,
mediating part of America's federalist system. But he does not celebrate their powers
or accomplishments as he celebrates local governments.
Third, Tocqueville observedthat the national government had been delegated only
a relatively few powers by the Constitution, including the powers of war, diplomacy
and maintaining an internal free market among the states. 76 But he also noted that the
national government of the United States, since the War of 1812, had not needed to
exercise its external powers because, unlike European States, the United States was not
threatened by any neighboring foreign power. 77 For Tocqueville, then, the idea and
success of a limited or weak national government in American democracy were much

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

See id at 57-63.
See id at 63-65.
See id at 82-93.
See id. at 79-93, 187-205, 235-43.
See WIEBE,supra note 48, at 194-208.
See TOCQUEVILLE,
supra note 1, at 107-13.
See id. at 118,265.
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more a matter of fortunate historical circumstances than wise political theory. 78
Indeed, he worried about the weakness of the federal government and the possibility
that in times of crisis (over slavery for example) it would prove too weak vis-a-vis the
more popular state governments to engage in effective national action. 79 And the
Nullification Crisis of 1829-1831, when South Carolina threatened to declare void
federal tariff laws that it deemed too high, was surely reason for Tocqueville to raise
this fear even though President Andrew Jackson prevailed in this case and South
Carolina stood down.so
Two other findings or theoretical assertions are significant in Tocqueville's
analysis, although these claims are more complicated, more speculative and less
supported by evidence than his findings about limited central government and activist
local governments. First, he argued that the democratic forms of government in
America, those of activist local governments and limited central governments; were
important to economic prosperity and the operations of a market economy-not only
because of the relative absence of economic regulations from weak central governments, but also because activist local governments, in Tocqueville's view, provided
instructive education for Americans in the entrepreneurial and business skills of
initiating new projects to solve immediate problems and organizing cooperative
behavior to implement the projects.s 1 Of course, as Tocqueville recognized, other
important factors causing American economic prosperity were rich natural resources,
open frontiers and the character of European immigrants to the United States. 82
Moreover, the American economy from the end of the War of 1812 had experienced
some marked boom-and-bust cycles, although by the early 1830s it was expanding at
an impressive rate. 83 Tocqueville's views about the relationships between economic
growth, a limited central government, and activist local governments, while supported
by the theories of Adam Smith, other contemporary writers, and his own historical
observations in America, are nonetheless best understood as slender theoretical
speculations rather than findings in view of the absence of any persuasive empirical
evidence. Moreover, any relationships between economic growth and the nature of

78. Id at 118-19; see also PIERSON,supra note 32, at 129-30. Here the author quotes from
Tocqueville' s letter to E. Chabrol dated June 9, 1831:
We are a long way from the ancient republics, it must be admitted, and yet this people is
republican and I don't doubt will long remain so. And the Republic is the best of governments.
I can only explain this phenomenon in thinking that America finds itself, for the
present, in a physical situation so happy that the interest of the individual is never opposed
to the interest of the whole, which is certainly not the case in Europe.
Here there is no public power and, to tell the truth, no need of it. The territorial boundaries
are very limited; the states have no enemies, consequently no armies, no tax, no central
government; the power of the executive is nothing, it gives neither money nor power. So
long as things stay thus, who will torment his life to attain it?

Id.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

See TOCQUEVILLE,
supra note I, at 359-62.
See, e.g., SELLERS,supra note 48, at 326-31 (on the Nullification Crisis).
See TOCQUEVILLE,
supra note I, at 63-65, 233-34.
See id. at 19-44, 266-74.
See SELLERS,supra note 48, at 131-39, 161-70, 343-45, 353-54.
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government that existed in the 1830s would seem to have little relevance to today's
economy of large-scale private organizations and large-scale government programs
that regulate and support these organizations. 84
Tocqueville also asserted that the religiosity of Americans was an important
source of democratic success in America, especially because ofreligion 's generation
or instruction of a widespread morality that supported obedience to laws, discipline in
the workplace, a tempering of materialist urges, and, thus, more effective uses of
freedom. 85 Tocqueville accordingly, while praising the separation of church and state
as a means to enhance universal religious beliefs, 86 commended politicians who
displayed their religious convictions as a useful means of supporting American
religiosity in general. 87 Yet Tocqueville's view of religion in America in the 1830s
seems partial, perhaps too heavily influenced by the establishment churchmen who
88
helped entertain Beaumont and Tocqueville in major East Coast cities. Moreover,
the 1820s and 1830s were a time of religious peace in America when religious
activities focused on the home and women and there was little public divisiveness
among America's different religions. 89 In these circumstances, it is perhaps
understandable that Tocqueville would follow Locke's and Jefferson's vision of
90
separate religious and political domains that should rarely if ever be in conflict.
Tocqueville's discussion of American religion in particular ignores or discounts
the passions and fundamentalism of the Second Great Awakening that was in full
swing at least in rural parts of America by the 1820s and was beginning to support
91
contentious political reforms that would protect the Sabbath and punish drinking. He
also fails to note the anti-Catholicism aimed at Catholic immigrants in coastal cities
that was appearing by 1830, 92 although anti-Catholicism did not become a major issue
in American politics until the 1840s. 93 Thus, Tocqueville was able to depict a religious
landscape in America that was pluralistic and tolerant ofreligious pluralism, churchgoing but non-dogmatic, to some extent deist, and willing to accept a general idea of
94
separation between church and state that included the clergy staying out ofpolitics.
Left out of this discussion or discounted in Democracy in America are different views
among Americans about the importance of religious doctrine and the appropriate

PUBLIC(2004) (arguing that high government spending on social
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JOELSLEMROD
REFORM(2003) (asserting that there is no demonstrated empirical relationship between the size of
government or level of taxes and economic growth in modem industrial economies).
supra note 1, at 275-88.
85. See TOCQUEVILLE,
86. See id at 283-86, 423-24.
87. See id at517-21.
supra note 32, at 62, 68-69, 72-73, 390-416, 458-73, 499.
88. See PIERSON,
89. See WIEBE,supra note 48, at 280-81, 305-06.
IO1 ( 1689) (J. W. Gough,
A LETTEROFTOLERATION
DETOLERANTIA:
90. See JOHNLocKE, EPISTOLA
trans., Raymond Klibansky ed., 1968); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Nehemiah Dodge et al. (Jan. 1,
WRITINGS510 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984); Michael w. McConnell,
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Spring 2004, at 127, 130-32.
Religious Souls and the Body Politic, THEPUBLICINTEREST,
supra note 48, at 202-36.
91. See SELLERS,
92. See id. at 390.
Spring 2004, at 177, 183-84.
93. See Philip Hamburger, Against Separation, THEPUBLICINTEREST,
supra note 1, at 275-88.
94. See TOCQUEVILLE,
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relationships between church and state, as well as the significant efforts by religious
reformers at state and local levels to obtain restrictive regulations that would enforce
morals upon members of the working and lower classes who were drinkers or were
licentious or undisciplined. 95 Tocqueville's views ofreligion in America and its democratic role, like his views of the American economy, thus seem to be idealized in ways
that might make the religion-democracy connection appeal to his European readers
without raising concerns about the more problematic and more violent aspects of
religious politics. In any event, Tocqueville's views on religion and government surely
do not capture or take account of the powerful, contentious positions that exist today
in relationships between religion and governments in American politics and law.96
There are also inherent tensions or contradictions in Tocqueville's larger
perspectives on democracy in America. The central problem of democracy in
Tocqueville's view was that democracy's passion for equality was compatible with
either a tyrannical government, which employed both legislation and administration
to destroy the freedom of individuals, or a government devoted to the liberty of equal
individuals. 97 Prescriptively, Tocqueville wanted to show how men can be both equal
and free, and he proposed a two-part resolution for obtaining appropriate liberties in
!l democratic society. 98 As Melvin Zetterbaum put it, the first part of this resolution
consisted ofTocqueville's belief, or hope, that the equality of conditions of the kind
he observed in America engenders in people's minds and hearts "an instinctive
inclination for political independence" 99 of each equal individual, although this passion
for "equality in freedom" 100 was itself of unequal strength with a democratic people's
"passion for equality." 101 The passion for freedom thus needed support from the art
of politics, which in America of the 1830s had been achieved by the emphasis and
reliance upon local governments, juries, an independent judiciary, the separation of
church and state, a very diffuse and decentralized free press, and the importance of
many civic associations accomplishing publicly useful tasks. 102
So Tocqueville resolved the contradiction between freedom and equality, at least
in theory, by relying upon the historical circumstances in America of both a
widespread equality of conditions that engendered an inclination for liberties, of the
self if not others, and a broad set of free institutions like the decentralized press,
decentralized government, and many small civic associations. Certainly his sense that
American democracy produces a passion for individual liberty has in the main held
true, although today respect for the liberties of others does not seem prevalent on
issues like abortion, physician-assisted suicide, gay rights or welfare reform. Yet one
can say without contradiction, I believe, that the passion for liberty of self has in recent
years tended to overwhelm any passion for the government promotion of an equality

95. On the moral reform efforts, especially against drinking, that engaged government regulations at
state and local levels, see SELLERS,supra note 48, at 259-66; WIEBE,supra note 48, at 230.
96. See infra Part V.
97. Zetterbaum, supra note 50, at 659; See also TOCQUEVILLE,
supra note I, at 235-49.
98. See Zetterbaum, supra note 50, at 659, 668-69.
99. Id. at 668.
100. Id at 669.
IOI. Id
102. Id at 668-69.
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of conditions in American society. Moreover, the free institutions that in Tocqueville's
view were necessary to maintain a balance between equality and liberty have changed
dramatically over the past two centuries, as regulations by state and national
governments have brought about the administrative state; as first the telegraphic
revolution and then the televisual revolution have centralized the powers of the press
and turned the news media to providing many fragmented bits of entertaining news;
as religions have entered the public sphere with passion and power; and as many civic
associations have become something like public utilities in their provision of services
to eager consumers. 103 Some of course would say that some of these developments
represent the passion for equality overriding the passion for liberty, as Tocqueville
feared, but the new imbalances of power also trample on equality and serve only the
liberties of the powerful, as we shall see.
Another larger perspective that Tocqueville brought to his analysis was
methodological. His political theory of America and of democracy was consciously
grounded in a historical and sociological approach, like Montesquieu but unlike many
previous political theorists such as Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. 104 On the one hand,
this suggests that any helpful application of Tocqueville's ideas to contemporary
constitutional issues should be relentlessly historical and sociological itself. On the
other hand, Tocqueville's penchant for making generalizations without empirical
support and for idealizing democracy seems in many places to diminish the accuracy
and power of his observations of America in the 1830s. These are methodological
qualifications we need to bring to our analysis ofTocqueville's more specific ideas
about the interactions of law and society.
In summary, Tocqueville's central insights into the nature of democracy in
America included his theory that the social state, or primary social forces, in any
society play an important role in determining the form and operations of its
government; that as of the 1830s the social state of America included an equality of
conditions that meant a rough equality ofattitude and self-esteem, as well as relatively
equal material opportunities, that supported the democratic forms of government
Tocqueville observed; that America's social state included strong tendencies towards
materialism, individualism, and relatively private kinds of religion that on balance
affected American democracy in favorable ways; and that historical circumstances,
including the social state, had provided American democracy by the 1830s with strong
local governments, relatively limited and unstable state governments, and a somewhat
inoperational national government. Further, Tocqueville's overriding normative
perspective sought to adjust the appropriate liberties of individuals with democracy's
passion for equality. This is the context in which we should consider Tocqueville's
more specific ideas and arguments.
Ill. DEMOCRACY, THE MNORITY WILL,ANDRIGHTS

When Tocqueville refers to democratic government as distinct from ~emocracy
as a social movement, he equates "democratic" with the majoritarian process or, in
other words, with the election of public officials by a majority or plurality of votes and

103. See infra Parts IV-VI for discussion of these developments.
104. See WOLIN,supra note 3; Wood, supra note 34.
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the majority voting by legislators that enables legislative action. 105 At the same time,
· however, he approves the distinctive American innovation of the power of judicial
review and the active use of this power by courts to enforce constitutional allocations
of power between the different branches of government and to protect individual
rights, particularly property rights, against the excesses or omnip~tence of the
majoritarian process. 106 Moreover, although he is neither very specific nor technical
about this, Tocqueville's interpretation of the relationships between the majoritarian
process, the power of judicial review, the process of judicial interpretation and
decisionmaking, and. individual rights appears to support a relatively robust and
flexible judicial recognition ofindividual constitutional rights, especially rights against
state governments.
Tocqueville perceived both advantages and adverse effects from a pure democracy
that is conceived of as both a social movement and majoritarian form of government.
Among the advantages, which in Tocqueville's view stem in good part from the
equality of conditions, are the development of a widespread "public spirit" 107 to
accomplish useful and important government tasks (particularly by actions of local
governments); a related enthusiasm for cooperative efforts among individuals in civil
society (by the actions of economic, religious, and other voluntary associations);
respect for the law ( for among equals, only law can provide social cohesion and order);
and, importantly, the "idea ofrights" 108 (for among equals, everyone deserves equal
autonomy). 109
But there are also vices of a pure democracy, which Tocqueville perceived in
several forms. First, there is the "legislative instability" 110 from democracy's frequent
elections that bring "new men to power," 111 and also the "administrative instability" 112
that results from a majority's tendency to write laws and then shift attention to other
matters, leaving administrators largely unsupervised. 113 Since most government power
was exercised by state governments in the 1830s, this criticism seems directed in
particular against state governments, which possessed relatively more legislative
power and held more frequent elections than the federal government. Second,
following Madison, Tocqueville describes and fears the ''tyranny of the majority," 114
which he defines broadly as the majority's imposition of unjust law upon the interests
or rights of individuals that causes "freedom to be in peril. " 115 While Tocqueville did

105. See TOCQUEVILLE,supra note I, at 235-37. Tocqueville writes, "It is of the very essence of
democratic governments that the empire of the majority is absolute; for in democracies, outside the majority
there is nothing that resists it." Id at 235.
106. See id at 93-98, 133-35, 248-57.
101. Id at 225-27.
108. Id at 227-29.
109. See id. at 220-35.
110. Id at 238.

Ill.

Id

112. Id at 198-99.
113. Id at 238-39.
114. Id at 239-42.
115. Id at 239-42. Tocqueville specifies, "I regard as impious and detestable the maxim that in matters
of government the majority of a people has the right to do everything, and nonetheless I place the origin of
all powers in the will of the majority. Am I in contradiction with myself?" Id at 240.
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not perceive much of this tyranny in America of the 1830s, neither did he perceive any
guarantee against this tyranny; he says only that "one must seek the causes of the
mildness of government in circumstances and mores rather than in the laws." 116
Third, official arbitrariness is another vice of democracy that is favored by the
omnipotence of the majority for, according to Tocqueville, the majority, perhaps
overwhelmed by its omnipotence, "regards public officials as its passive agents and
willingly deposits in them the care of serving its designs," without specifying ''the
details of their duties." 117 Fourth, democracy as a social movement produces the
milder despotism of the conformity of thought about what is right to shifting, fickle
majority opinions. Without an authoritative religious or political doctrine, and with
everyone's opinion equal to everyone else's in a democracy, intellectual uncertainties
and anxieties about what to believe or what to think produce a herd instinct among
Americans; only what is authorized by majority public opinion can be truthful or
useful. Thus Tocqueville says, "[i]n America the majority draws a formidable circle
around thought. Inside those limits, the writer is free; but unhappiness awaits him if
he dares to leave them." 118 This conformity of thought discourages high quality
leadership in public life and is also likely to be a cause of the tyranny of the majority
and resulting unjust laws that unfairly oppress individuals and their liberties. 119 In
sum, the vices of democracy can threaten democratic governments in two principal
ways: by a"[ c]omplete enslavement of the legislative power to the will of the electoral
body" and by a "[ c]oncentration in the legislative power of all the other powers of
government." 120 These events may override the legitimate rights of individuals in a
democracy and ultimately produce illegitimate govemment. 121
Although Tocqueville saw no guarantee against the tyranny of the majority or
oppressive conformity of thought, he did theorize that three factors in the
circumstances and mores of American life might temper the tyranny of the majority. 122
Two of these factors, the absence of administrative centralization and the jury as a
political institution, will be considered later as shifting features of American
government and its federalist system. 123 The third factor, lawyers, speaks more directly
to Tocqueville's theory of rights as an important counterweight to the majority will.
The lawyer factor included the importance to American government of judges and the
power of judicial review, and this factor, when combined with Tocqueville's theory
of democracy, supports the vigorous protection of individual constitutional rights
against the oppressive conformity of majority opinions that are adopted for no other
reason than the desire to be right in the eyes of the current majority within a
democratic society.
Tocqueville did not develop a full-blown theory about the judicial protection of
individual constitutional rights, and his perspective on this issue must be constructed

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id at 242.
Id. at 242-43.
Id. at 244.
See id at 235-49, 661-65.
Id at 146.
See id. at 246-49.
Id at 250-64.
See infra Part IV.
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from several of his observations. First, he praised the special American power of
judicial review as a necessary constraint upon majoritarian excesses while recognizing
both the special legal qualities and political importance of this power. 124 He
recognized, that is, that the power of judicial review is confined to deciding only cases
and controversies which litigants properly bring before the courts. 125 But he appreciated the political importance of this power in maintaining an appropriate balance of
power between federal and state governments 126 and in protecting individuals from
unjust or oppressive laws. 127
Second, like Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland, 128 Tocqueville
recognized that the written Constitution was incomplete at the time of its making due
to the impossibility of fixing "beforehand, in an exact and complete manner, the
portion of power that would fall to each of the two governments between which
sovereignty was going to be apportioned" or foreseeing "in advance all the details of
the life of a people." 129 The written Constitution thus marks only the great objects of
government and individual rights, and the details of constitutional law will necessarily
depend upon reasonable interpretations by the courts to ensure that governments can
relate appropriately to their changing circumstances. 130 To accomplish this, federal
judges "must not only be good citizens, educated and upright men-qualities
necessary to all magistrates," but they must also be "statesmen ... [who] know how
to discern the spirit of their times, to confront the obstacles they can defeat, and to tum
away from the current when the flood threatens to carry away with them the
sovereignty of the Union and the obedience to its laws." 131
Finally, the interpretive process for constitutional issues will be successful only
if prudent, statesmen-like judges engage in debate and deliberation over competing and
shifting principles and weigh these principles in the light of the relevant circumstances
in ways which ultimately satisfy the sovereignty of public opinion in the long run and
thereby obtain legitimacy. For Tocqueville:
In the hands of ... federal judges rest ceaselessly the peace, the prosperity, the very
existence of the Union. Without them, the Constitution is a dead letter; to them, the
executive power appeals to resist the encroachments of the legislative body; the
legislature, to defend itself against the undertakings of the executive power; the
Union, to have itself obeyed by the states; the states, to repel the exaggerated
pretensions of the Union; the public interest against private interest; the spirit of

124. See TOCQUEVILLE,
supra note I, at 93-98, 130-42, 146,257.
125. See id. at 93-98.
126. See id. at 107-08.
127. Id at 257. Tocqueville writes, "Armed with the right to declare laws unconstitutional, the American
magistrate constantly enters into public affairs. He cannot force the people to make laws, but at least he
constrains them not to be unfaithful to their own laws and to remain in accord with themselves." Id.
128. 17U.S.(4Wheat.)316(1819).
129. TOCQUEVILLE,
supra note I, at 107.
130. See id. at 107-08, 141-42.
131. Id. at 142. In supporting judicial resistance to "the flood" of public opinion that can threaten "the
sovereignty of the Union and the obedience to its laws," Toqueville was following both Chancellor Kent
and Justice Story in their support for judicial review that protects constitutional principles against mere
public opinion. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Marbury and the Retreat from Judicial Supremacy, 20 CONST.
COMMENT.205, 219-20 (2003) (Kent's view); Newmyer, supra note 47, at 114 (Story's view).
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conservationagainst democratic instability. Their power is immense; but it is the
power of opinion. They are omnipotent as long as the people consent to obey the
law; they can do nothing when they scorn it. Now, the powerof opinion is that which
is most difficult to make use of, because it is impossibleto say exactly where its
limits are. It is often as dangerousto fall short of them as to exceed them.132
Whatever one may think about the openness or apparent subjectivity of
Tocqueville's perspective on constitutional judging, 133 it clearly is not consistent with
either the maintenance-model or legal science approach to constitutional law of Joseph
Story, who emphasized close textual analysis, historical explications of textual meanings, and reliance on the common law in order to preserve the fundamental principles
of the founders; 134 or the strict originalist theories of jurists like Roger Taney, 135
Antonin Scalia, 136 and Robert Bork 137 who have wanted to tie constitutional law to ·
clear and specific original meanings. Perhaps the forward-looking qualities in
Tocqueville's view of judging suggest that he was endorsing (or would have endorsed)
something like Michael Perry's theory about the constitutional interpretation of
individual rights as a kind of"moral prophecy." 138 But Tocqueville also praised the
American legal profession for constituting a conservative, "aristocratic," or liberal
constraint upon the majority will, 139 and his analysis of democracy in America gives
significant weight to history or time in explaining and understanding public opinion.
Tocqueville's endorsement of flexible, evolving constitutional interpretation thus
appears to be more like the jurisprudence of John Marshall, who emphasized reasoning
from the first principles of government to help rationalize the constitution, 140 and the
jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin, who emphasizes applying moral principles that are
embedded in legal authorities in order to resolve hard cases in a way that is both
backward-looking (as a matter of the "fit" between the embedded moral principles and
constitutional authorities) and forward-looking (as a matter of "justification" by

132. TOQUEVILLE,
supra note I, at 146.
133. For a negative view, see Matthew J. Franck, Statesmanship and the Judiciary, SI REV.POL. 510
(1989).
134. See PAUL w. KAHN, LEGITIMACYAND HISTORY: SELF-GoVERNMENT
IN AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL
THEORY38-45 (1992) (describing Story's constitutional theory as articulated in Story's
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States); see generally MCCLELLAN,supra note 47
(describing Story's "common law constitutionalism").
135. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 399-454 (1857); KAHN,supra note 134, at4653; CHARLES
W. SMITH,JR., ROGERB. TANEY,JACKSONIAN
JURIST155-76 (1936).
136. See generally SCALIA,supra note I 9; Scalia, supra note 18.
137. See ROBERT
H. BORK,THETEMPTING
OFAMERICA,
143-160( 1990). See generally Bork, supra note
18.
138. See MICHAEL
J. PERRY,THECONSTITUTION,
THECOURTS,
ANDHUMANRIGHTS112 ( 1982).
supra note I, at 251-58.
139. See TOCQUEVILLE
140. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 146-52 (1803) (arguing from the first principles
of a written constitution to help justify the power of judicial review); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 353 (1819) (arguing from the first principles of the constitutional text and its framing to help
justify the implied powers doctrine and the authority of Congress to create a national bank); KAHN,supra
note 134, at 24-31 (describing Marshall's jurisprudence as reasoning from the first principles of
government).
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choosing an interpretation of moral principles that would make law ''the best that it
can be").141
How might a Tocquevillian jurist today contemplate cutting edge constitutional
cases that involve restrictions on, say, abortions, homosexuality or pornography? In
assessing the relationships of these issues to evolving but contested public opinion, the
majority will, and individual rights, she would in the first place want to take into
account that "democracy" is both a social movement and a form of majoritarian
decision-making by government. This would require developing a conception of
democracy that is more complex and richer than mere majority voting and one that
makes some fair sense of contemporary democracy as a social movement. This
conception might incorporate a democratic commitment to the constitutional history
of the American people, a commitment which engages the courts as a democratic
rather than anti-democratic institution in preserving the fundamental principles of
American society as they have been shaped and revealed throughout history by the
writing of the constitutional text and its major judicial interpretations. 142 Or this
conception might incorporate a democratic commitment to the idea that a democracy's
fundamental purpose and obligation are to respect and promote the interests and values
of all persons, which are best served by resolving issues of basic moral principle (as
distinct from issues of policy or expediency) through constitutional decisions by the
courts rather than by majority voting of legislatures.143 Or one's conception of
democracy might attempt to incorporate and balance both of these democratic
commitments together with a third democratic commitment to the power of majority
voting. 144
More specifically, a Tocquevillian jurist will need to interpret the conflicting
opinions and social movements that swirl around the constitutional issues of abortions,
gay rights, and pornography in order to determine what kinds of decisions promise to
promote an equality of conditions that will support a vibrant healthy democracy. This
jurist might begin by characterizing these conflicts as integral aspects of America's
contemporary "culture wars." 145 Justice Scalia of course believes that such conflicts
should be relegated to legislatures where a rnajoritarian process can decide the winners
and losers. 146 He asserts, but without elaboration, that the majoritarian process, unlike
the courts, provides the losers at least with ''the satisfaction of a fair hearing and an
honest fight." 147 Justice Scalia's metaphor of a playground brawl reveals, however,

141. See generally DWORKIN,supra note 18.
172SELF-GoVERNMENT
OFCONSTITUTIONAL
ANDTIME:A THEORY
FREEDOM
142. See JEDRUBENFELD,
74 (2001).
(200 I).
SELF-GoVERNMENT
CONSTITUTIONAL
L. EISGRUBER,
143. See generally CHRISTOPHER
144. See generally Philip C. Kissam, Triangulating Constitutional Theory: Power, Time, and Everyman,
53 BUFF.L. REV.269 (2005) (arguing that three-dimensional constitutional theories, which incorporate and
balance the three independent values of power, time and everyman, fit best with our constitutional practices
and are the most attractive kind of theory for democracy).
TO DEFINEAMERICA
145. See generally JAMESDAVISONHUNTER,CULTUREWARS:THE STRUGGLE
(1991); Cf Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 652-53 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (characterizing the issue
of legal rights for homosexuals as part of a "culture war'' in America).
146. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 603-04 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Romer, 517 U.S. at
652 (Scalia, J ., dissenting).
147. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, SOSU.S. 833, 1002 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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perhaps unintentionally, both the absence of an impartial decisionmaker and the
likelihood that neither side is listening to the other within the legislative process.
Allocating such issues to legislatures rather than courts, then, would seem to provide
a rather strange sort of "fair hearing" and "honest fight" in terms of how we expect
democracies to proceed. Democratic deliberation over today's hot-button cultural
issues may be better served by the courts rather than state legislatures.
Most importantly, these cultural conflicts in public opinion are asymmetric; one
side wants to impose its opinion on others ( about the time at which human personhood
begins, or the sanctity ofheterosexual marriages, or the offensiveness of pornography),
while the other side in these issues just wants to be let alone, free from any majority
opinion that the democratic forms of government may register and wish to impose
upon them. In the Tocquevillian perspective, regulations based on majority opinions
that would merely enforce conformity to a majority public opinion about what is right
are just the sorts of situations that constitutional law should invalidate unless the
government can provide convincing evidence of harms to other persons that would
occur without regulation. In these situations the mild despotism of majority opinions
in democracies that Tocqueville feared merges with the tyranny of the majority by
legislative regulations that Tocqueville also feared. Of course, in the 1830s, when
most constitutionally questionable legislative regulations involved contracts and
property, Tocqueville seemed to think that opinions alone would restrict morals while
oppressive legislation would concern property rights. But given the modem merger
of opinions and restrictive legislation on cultural matters, it seems that the
Tocquevillian jurist today would want to provide the same robust protection for
individual social and cultural rights as Tocqueville recommended for property rights
in the 1830s.
In the case of abortions, as Justice Blackmun reasoned in Roe v. Wade,148 the
argument that abortions cause specific harm to another person reduces to a question
of faith or opinion-religious or otherwise-about whether (or when) the fetus is a
person. 149 Similarly, public opinion that gay marriages may be prohibited without
violating equal protection or the privacy right under the due process clause seems to
be based only upon opinions with no convincing showing of specific harms to
persons. 150 To be sure, it is claimed that heterosexual marriages are necessary to
promote "the welfare of children and the stability of society," 151 but since such
marriages have been the only marriages in history there is no evidence that allowing
homosexual marriages would diminish the welfare of children or social stability.

148. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
149. Id. at 161-62. See also RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DoMINION (1993); KENT GREENAWALT,
RELIGIOUSCONVICTIONSAND POLmCAL CHOICE, 112-14, 120-43 (1988); Arnold H. Loewy, Morals
Legislation and the Establishment Clause, 55 ALA. L. REV. 159, 175-81 (2003). Greenawalt and Loewy
argue that religious faith about the "fact" or "purpose" of when a human life begins deserves consideration
in constitutional argument because different "faiths" of a similar sort figure into all kinds of factual or
purposive interpretations in constitutional law.
150. CJ Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571 (rejecting the argument that moral opinions about sodomy between
homosexuals is a justification for banning such sodomy); Romer, 517 U.S. at 633-36 (rejecting argument
that moral opinions that disfavor homosexuality are justification for prohibiting laws that would protect
homosexuals from discrimination).
151. Bush's Remarks on Marriage Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2004, at Al8.
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Regulating pornography is a more difficult issue in my view because of the argument
that pornography of many kinds subordinates women and thus may have a wide range
of effects that disadvantage women. 152 Regulating pornography may thus tend to
promote the equality of conditions that is the hallmark ofTocquevillian democracy.
But even here, given the uncertain nature of pornographic effects and, importantly, the
weakness ofremedies that are aimed at hard core pornography but leave vast quantities
of soft core pornography untouched, there is room to conclude that the prohibition of
pornography essentially would constitute the imposition of majority opinions designed
to coerce conformity to these opinions. In all three situations, then, the democratic
measure of equality of conditions that includes respect for the opinions of each person
may be satisfied by judicial decisions that invalidate government restrictions that are
based merely on majority opinions about the harms of abortions, homosexuality, and
pornography.
The Tocquevillian perspective on constitutional rights throws light on other issues
as well. Consider, for example, the religion clauses. Under the free exercise clause,
regulations with a purpose or animus to disadvantage particular religious practices are
unconstitutional, 153 and this rule clearly is aimed at preventing majority religious
opinions from justifying coercive regulations of non-conforming views. But overtly
secular government actions, like building a road over an Indian burial site in a national
forest 154 or applying drug laws to the religious use of peyote, 155 may or may not be
animated by a distaste among public decision-makers for minority religious beliefs and
practices. It would be appropriate, therefore, for courts to apply heightened scrutiny
to such actions in order to "smoke out" illegitimate cases of animus or bad purpose
while leaving alone legitimate secular decisions. 156 Although a narrow majority of the
Supreme Court seemed to hold otherwise in Employment Division v. Smith, 157 the
Court's subsequent readiness to find religious animus in the face of claims about
secular purposes in Church of the Lukumi Baba/u Aye 158 suggests that the Court may
be willing to smoke out cases that have been animated by conformity-seeking majority
religious opinions even without a formal rule of heightened scrutiny. This would be
a Tocquevillian resolution.
Under the Establishment Clause, recent Supreme Court decisions have revealed
a Court interested in continuing to invalidate officially sponsored religious exercises
in public schools, is9 but willing to allow substantial public funding ofindividuals who

152. See Catherine A. MacKiMon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV.
I (1985); see also Rae Langton, Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts, 22 PHIL.& PUB. AFF. 293 (1993) (on
the perfonnative or imperative aspects of pornographic speech that subordinate women).
153. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
154. See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
155. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
I 56. See RUBENFELD,supra note 142, at 206-07 (interpreting the concept of strict scrutiny in
constitutional law as designed to smoke out illegitimate purposes).
157. 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that city ordinances that prohibited animal sacrifice were violations
of the Free Exercise Clause).
158. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
159. See, e.g., Santa Fe lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577
(1992).
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choose religious forms of education that include religious practices. 160 The first
situation, in essence, involves various kinds of officially sponsored prayers in public
schools that, in effect, impose a conformity-seeking majority opinion or just the sort
of mild despotism of majority opinions that Tocqueville decried. Non-conforming
students are not formally coerced by officially-sponsored prayers into praying with
others, but they are exposed to implicit criticism by the majority for their nonconforming views if they refuse to participate. In the second situation, however, there
is no direct coercion or criticism of non-conforming individuals unless one considers
the payment of taxes that support religious views to be coercive on the taxpayer in
some relevant constitutional sense. 161 Here too we see apparent Tocquevillian
resolutions of difficult constitutional issues that would promote the equality of
conditions in contemporary American democracy.
IV.

DEMOCRACY AND FEDERALISM

Tocqueville clearly perceived decentralized government as a foundational aspect
of American democracy. 162 The focus of his analysis, however, was much more on
local governments rather than state governments. 163 In Tocqueville's view, local
government provided opportunities for individuals to participate in policy-making and
administration, enhanced the potential accountability of office holders to voters, and
allowed the construction of appropriate government responses to diverse local
conditions and problems. Active local governments, including local courts and the
jury system, also promoted an entrepreneurial and cooperative spirit among the people
that spilled over into civil society and the economy, thus enhancing both the
democratic and economic prosperity of Americans outside the formal bounds of
government. State governments, on the other hand, were described with some
ambivalence. These governments, especially their legislatures, embodied the
democratic idea of majority rule and the freedom of individuals to participate in
government, 164 and they provided "strong governmental centralization" in terms of
adopting general laws, including laws to help organize local governments, 165 that was
necessary to address the "multiple and complicated" rights and duties that state

160. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding the constitutionality of school
vouchers for private religious schools).
161. Whatever the constitutional sense about this kind of tax payment may have been at the founding of
the constitution, it seems like a weak argument today given the many kinds of tax payments to which one
might constitutionally object, but to no avail, and especially given the Establishment Clause precedents,
which since Everson v. Bd of Educ., 330 U.S. l (1947), have allowed public funds to provide indirect
support to religious practices when the funds are provided directly to support the secular activities of
religious programs.
162. See, e.g., TOQUEVILLE,supra note I, at 56 (''The great political principles that govern American
society today were born and developed in the state; one cannot doubt it. It is therefore the state that one
must know to have the key to all the rest.").
163. See id. at 56-93. Tocqueville devotes much more discussion to local governments and their
relationship to the states than to the nature of state governments and describes townships, counties, and state
governments as "three sources of action that could be compared to the various nervous centers that make
the human body move." Id at 56.
164. See id. at 236-37.
165. Id. at 83.

HeinOnline -- 59 Me. L. Rev. 59 2007

60

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:1

governments faced in the American system. 166But Tocqueville perceived that states
had granted excessive power to their legislatures and electorates, 167and that this power
could become the site of oppressive legislation adopted by fickle, unstable majority
opinions or, in other words, a central site for "the tyranny of the majority." 168
It thus would be wrong to think that Tocqueville's appreciation of decentralized
government provides plentiful support for arguments on behalf of states' rights or state
powers against the national government in the kinds of federalism issues that the
Supreme Court has had to deal with throughout our constitutional history. It would
also be wrong to think that Tocqueville believed that the power of states in American
federalism somehow justifies judicial deference to state legislatures whenever "the
majority will" desires to regulate individual behavior. Three themes in his analysis of
decentralized American government in the 1830s suggest that Tocqueville's
perspective on American federalism was quite different from the one that states' rights
advocates imagine.
First, as noted, Tocqueville's emphasis on decentralized government focused on
active local or township governments and paid relatively little attention to state governments.169 It was in local governments, especially the paradigmatic New England
township meeting, and the jury that Tocqueville located the merits of decentralized
government: participation, accountability and education in entrepreneurial and
cooperative actions. Moreover, the Frenchman's knowledge and experience of
centralized French government helped him perceive that a major feature of American
state governments lay in their separation of"government," or lawmaking, for which
state legislatures were responsible, from "administration," or the enforcement oflaws,
which tended to be delegated to county and township officials, thus enhancing the
responsibility and activities oflocal governments vis-a-vis the states. 170 As some of
Tocqueville's informants told him, democracy in America consisted essentially of a
linked group of local republics or small city-states or, in other words, local
governments, which had pre-existed and helped construct state governments and thus
established the distinctive character of American government. 171
Second, Tocqueville clearly appreciated the principle of subsidiarity-the
principle that central government authority should act, and only act, when a
government function cannot be performed competently at a more local level. 172 But

166. Id. at 107.
167. Id. at 236 (describing the short terms and similarity of representatives in both houses of state
legislatures and the diminished executive and judicial powers).
168. See id. at 235-49.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 71-75, 163.
170. See TOCQUEVILLE,
supra note l, at 82-93. See also SCHLEIFER,
supra note 46, at 129-3 7 ( describing
Tocqueville's discovery of this important distinction).
17 l. See PIERSON,supra note 32, at 405-13 (describing the influence of Josiah Quincy, President of
Harvard University, and the Reverend Jared Sparks, a historian and publisher of the North American Review,
on Tocqueville's thinking about the importance oflocal governments, especially the New England township,
to American government).
172. See TOCQUEVILLE,supra note l, at 107-08; Andrew Koppelman, How "Decentralization"
Rationalizes Oligarchy: John McGinnis and the Rehnquist Court, 20 CONST.COMMENT.11, 12 (2003);
Robert K. Vischer, Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance: Beyond Devolution, 35 IND.L. REV.I 03, 142
(200 I). James Madison in Federalist # 14 recognized in a general way the principle of subsidiarity as part
of the American constitutional structure. ALEXANDERHAMILTON,JOHN JAY & JAMESMADISON,THE
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of course this principle is not the same as the principle of state sovereignty-the
principle or idea that constitutional law should protect some core notion ofindependent
state government functions from national regulation. The principle of state sovereignty
has been used by the Supreme Court to justify its contemporary constitutional
limitations on national government in cases like United States v. Lopez,' 73 United
States v. Morrison, 174 New York v. United States, 175 and Printz v. United States 116 that
have carved out domains of regulatory activity that are reserved for the states free from
national regulation. In fact, the principle of subsidiarity endorsed by Tocqueville
would place the responsibility of deciding what functions to delegate to states, and
what functions to regulate by national laws, primarily in the hands of the national
legislature rather than the courts because the national legislature would appear to be
the most appropriate body for determining when national regulations are needed to
address social problems and when functions may be delegated. 177
Third, Tocqueville does not seem to have thought very highly of the capacity of
state governments to govern wisely, innovatively, or experimentally as states' rights
theorists like to claim. State governments in Tocqueville's account tended to be
relatively unstable and weak due to the frequency of state elections, populist politics
at the state level, frequent shifts in voter opinions, and the tendency of American
politics and its "equality of condition" attitudes to drive exceptional leaders away from
politics and government. 178 He also noted the inherent popularity of state governments
by comparison to the more distant national government, and he worried that in times
when the exercise of strong national powers should become necessary that the national
government might not have either the legitimacy or power to claim and execute such
powers successfully. 179 Tocqueville thus never endorses any strong principle of state
sovereignty, nor does he particularly applaud state policymaking. Local governments,
juries, and administrative decentralization of state governments are featured instead
as the foundational aspects of American federalist government and democracy.
The relevance to modem constitutional law ofTocqueville's distinctive take on
American federalism may seem unclear but at least two observations are pertinent.
First, at the beginning of the twenty-first century local governments are still an
important, often overlooked part of American government, although they no longer
resemble Tocqueville's paradigm of the New England town meeting with its small
size, its homogenous polity, its substantial possibilities for citizen participation, the
close accountability of public officials, and the education of citizens for participation
in the larger civil society. Local governments today tend to be relatively large and

FEDERALIST
NO. 14, at 82 (Alexander Hamilton, John Jay & James Madison) (Robert Scigliano ed., 2000)
("The subordinate governments, which can extend their care to all those other objects which can be
separately provided for, will retain their due authority and activity.").
173. 514 U.S. 549 (I 995) (invalidating a federal "gun free school zone" act).
174. 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating a federal civil remedy for gender-motivated violence).
175. 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (invalidating a federal law regulating the disposal of low-level radioactive
waste by state governments).
176. 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (invalidating a federal law requiring the temporary use of state and local police
officers to check information on gun purchasers while a new federal gun-control program was established).
177. See generally Koppelman, supra note 172.
178. See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note I, at 238-43.
179. See id. at 348-79.
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impersonal organizations that serve diverse, complex and multi-cultural constituencies
by administering complex regulatory schemes that rarely engage citizens other than
as subjects of regulation. Similarly, notwithstanding its often mythic presentation in
popular culture, the jury today hardly seems to be a center of democratic education
when juries have reduced powers (by comparison to the early 1800s when, for
example, juries decided questions oflaw as well as fact and decisions notwithstanding
the verdict were unheard of), 180 many persons desire to flee jury service, and most
persons who are called to jury service are never empanelled. 181 Tocqueville praised
the relative autonomy of local governments in the 1830s, but today's complex forms
of local government would appear to deserve relatively close judicial supervision in
many cases in order to protect several types of constitutional rights.
For example, the significant local government agencies that tend to serve
relatively homogenous populations in suburban areas often arrogate state powers to
coerce conformity among their residents, to exclude others from the community by
exclusionary zoning measures, and to retain control of the property tax as a local
privilege. 182 In this context, the close constitutional supervision oflocal governments
that courts often provide under the free speech, free exercise, due process and equal
protection clauses 183 and the constitutional supervision of public school financing that
some state courts have provided 184 make good sense in terms of ensuring the basic
fairness and inclusiveness of local government operations. The policymakers and
administrators of local governments are likely to be operating under the pressure of
particular interest groups and taxpayer demands for efficiency or low taxes that
displace any traditional local government concerns for basic fairness and the interests
of all persons. 18s Furthermore, appreciating the close and intertwined modem
relationships between state and local governments and applying careful judicial
scrutiny to these relationships, as many state courts have done in school financing
litigation 186-but as the Supreme Court failed to do in its leading school financing case
of San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez 181 and its leading urban/

180. See Rachel Bartow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury s Constitutional Role in the Era of
Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA.L. REV.33, 66-69 (2003).
181. See, e.g., Susan Saulny, Jury Duty? Prepare for Rejection, N.Y. TIMES,Sept. 8, 2003, at Bl.
182. See Schragger, supra note 66.
183. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Bablu Aye, Inc. v. City ofHileah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (applying
free exercise analysis to a city's ban on animal sacrifices); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469 (1989) (applying equal protection analysis to a city's affrrmative action contracting program); Frisby
v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (applying free speech analysis to a city's ban on picketing before residential
properties); Moore v. City ofE. Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (applying due process analysis to a
zoning regulation prohibiting a grandmother living with two grandchildren who were cousins).
184. See Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance Reform, 48 VAND.
L. REV.JOI (1995); Richard E. Levy, Gunfight at the K-12 Co"al: Legislative vs. Judicial Power in the
Kansas School Finance Litigation, 54 U. KAN.L. REv. 1021 (2006); James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and
Money, 109 YALEL. J. 249 (1999).
supra note 143, at 87-96.
185. See EISGRUBER,
186. See Enrich, supra note 184; Levy, supra note 184; Ryan, supra note 184.
187. 411 U.S. I (1973) (denying an equal protection challenge to unequal public school financing in
Texas that relied basically on the local control of property taxes for school financing).
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suburban school desegregation case of Milliken v. Bradley 188-would appear to be an
important area of local and state government that deserves close judicial supervision.
In these various conditions, the principle of subsidiarity suggests that federal and
state courts rather than local governments or permissive state legislatures may be the
effective agencies to ensure a constitutionally fair provision of government services.
To be sure, standards to promote an equality of conditions in suburban zoning and
public school financing are not easy to ascertain. But courts can at least invalidate
egregious situations of inequality in these arenas and promote democratic discourse
about constitutional fairness by forcing state legislatures to consider and provide
regulatory schemes that are less unequal.
The Tocquevillian perspective on American federalism also invites talcing a
second look at the New Federalism cases decided by the Rehnquist Court. When
Congress enacted the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990,189 it appears to have made
no finding under the principle of subsidiarity that state and local governments could
not adequately use their criminal and civil laws to regulate and sanction guns in
schools. 190 Thus, the Court's decision in United States v. Lopez 191 that Congress did
not have constitutional authority to invade the state's traditional criminal law functions
is perhaps a useful signal to Congress to take federalism and the principle of
subsidiarity seriously and not to act merely on the basis of political grandstanding. 192
The tenuous theoretical case for connecting the possession of guns in schools to
interstate commerce, although one could be made, 193 allowed the Supreme Court the
freedom to send this federalism signal to Congress that traditional state functions,
which have seemed to work adequately under the subsidiarity principle, should not be
lightly dismissed or regulated by Congress without good cause.
But under the principle of subsidiarity, the constitutionality ofnational legislation
looks quite different in three other cases: United States v. Mo"ison,' 94 New York v.
United States 195 and Printz v. United States. 196 The federal laws challenged in these
cases were adopted only after Congress considered the potential increased
effectiveness of new federal laws to supplement or mandate state actions and, at least
in the cases of Mo"ison and New York v. United States, a large number of state public
officials agreed with the need for the new laws. Moreover, each of these cases could
be justified under Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce much more easily
than the gun-free school zone law at issue in Lopez. In Mo"ison, Congress adopted
a federal civil remedy for gender-related violence after findings (supported by many
state Attorneys General) that state laws against domestic violence and rape were not

188. 418 U.S. 717 (I 974)(limiting inter-district school desegregation remedies for racially discriminatory
acts that are a substantial cause of inter-district segregation, despite the state's overall responsibility for local
school districts).
189. 10 u.s.c.§ 922(q) (1990).
190. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995).
191. Id. at 549.
192. See Boeerrr, supra note 24, at 190-9S (describing the cueing function of judicial review as
illustrated by Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)).
193. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 615-18 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
194. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
195. S05 U.S. 144 (1992).
196. 521 U .s.898 ( 1997).
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working adequately to protect women and additional findings that at least some women
hesitated to travel or take jobs interstate because of their fears of urban violence. 197 In
New York v. United States, Congress passed a law forcing certain policy decisions by
states regarding the disposal of low-level radioactive waste after states had failed to
agree among themselves on depository states and state governments had negotiated
with Congress for the new law. 198 In Printz, Congress had required state and local
police and sheriff officers to temporarily assist the federal government in the
establishment of background checks on gun purchasers, to make the law effective
before fully-run federal system could be established. 199 Tocquevillian federalism and
the subsidiarity principle appear to support contrary results to those produced by the
originalist theorizing of the Supreme Court's majority in each of these cases.

a

V. DEMOCRACY AND RELIGION
Tocqueville saw and praised religion as another foundational aspect of American
democracy, especially because of religion's capacity to generate a morality that
supported social order, obedience to democratic laws, discipline in the workplace, and
spiritual desires that could mitigate democracy's incentives towards pure individualism
and materialism. 200 He also alluded in a general way to the role of religious dissenters
who settled the American colonies as forming part of the point of departure for the
creation of America's democracy. 201 In fact, ifTocqueville, a committed Catholic, had
been able to explore the dissenting Protestant traditions in American religions during
the colonial, revolutionary and early republican eras more fully, he might have been
able to make a more specific case that the anti-authoritarian attitudes and practices
among dissenting Protestant sects constituted a significant cause of the equality of
conditions and democratization of American society and government. 202
But Tocqueville's views on American religion and government were idealized and
based firmly on the historical circumstances of the 1830s. His views about religion
certainly do not support the turn to "political religion" that has occurred in the United
States today, 203 nor do they support all the constitutional claims that are made today
on behalf of political religion. 204 Tocqueville's views on religion thus deserve a
careful examination, both for their possible insights and to guard against their possible

197. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615.
198. See New York, 505 U.S. at 150-51.
199. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 902-04.
supra note I, at 274-88, 417-26, 517-21; supra text accompanying notes 85-96.
200. See TOCQUEVILLE,
201. See TOCQUEVILLE,
supra note I, at 29-30, 276.
OFAMERICAN
CHRISTIANITY
(1989);
202. See generally NATHAN0. HATCH,THEDEMOCRATIZATION
See also Gordon S. Wood.Religion and the American Revolution, in NEW DIRECTIONS
IN AMERICAN
RELIGIOUS
HISTORY173, 187-91 (Harry s. Stout & D.G. Hart eds., 1997).
203. On the nature of "political religion" and its presence in modern politics, see MARCELACRISTI,
FROMCIVILTO POLITICAL
RELIGION:
THE INTERSECTION
OF CULTURE,
RELIGION
ANDPOLITICSI 10-14
(2001); Dwight B. Billings & Shaunna L. Scott, Religion and Political Legitimation, 20 ANN. REV.Soc.
173, 175-81 (I 994).
204. On the potential for contemporary political religion to influence a good deal of modem
constitutional law, see, GREENAWALT
supra note 149, at 112-14; MICHAELJ. PERRY,UNDERGOD?
RELIGIOUS
FAITHANDLIBERAL
DEMOCRACY
(2003).
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misuse when they are taken out of context to support contemporary ideas about the
proper role of religion in politics.
Although Tocqueville did not distinguish between the concepts, he in effect
recognized, two different kinds of religious phenomena as important to the healthy
functioning of American democracy. One was the widespread existence of pluralistic
"private" religious beliefs that can be associated with the many different churches and
other religious institutions in America. These beliefs, practices and institutions,
Tocqueville argued, are important to democracy because they generate a strong morality among the public that laws should be obeyed, that individuals should be ethical in
their relationships to others, that restraints on materialist desires are appropriate, and
that individuals have duties to themselves, their families, and their God to become and
remain both politically free and disciplined prosperous workers. Democracy, the
economy, and individuals can thus prosper with this sort ofreligious-backed morality
in the background. 205 Moreover, widespread religious pluralism in Tocqueville's view
supports a pervasive tolerance for religious diversity and general acceptance of ''the
separation of church and state," even or especially among American Catholics about
whose place in American society the Catholic Tocqueville seems to have been
particularly interested. 206 Tocqueville noted approvingly, for example, that the
American clergy including Catholic priests approved of ''the separation between
church and state" and that the clergy refrained from politics, or at least from running
for public offices. 207 He also noted with approval the relative lack of dogmatism in
American religious beliefs. 208 These various restraints on religious ideas and practices
supported the tolerance of religious pluralism and absence of religiously-motivated
political divisiveness in America.
Tocqueville's view of private religion in America in the 1830s is an attractive one
but is also idealized. He and his companion Beaumont, visiting mostly in large
American cities and entertained by the urban elites, appear to have essentially
overlooked or discounted the Second Great Awakening of the 1820s and 1830s and its
effects in educating many Americans in dogmatic fundamentalist beliefs and
encouraging political movements at state and local levels to legislate the morality of
drinking and sexual behavior. 209 He also made no mention of the anti-Catholic
sentiments that were beginning to be raised against Catholic immigrants to American
cities by the 1830s.210 Nor had public schools and the conflicts between public and
Catholic schools developed by the 1830s into the caldron of religious disputes that
would occur later in the 19th and 20th centuries. Tocqueville's depiction of private
religion then could easily separate politics and law, on the one hand, from religious
beliefs and practices on the other. Private religion conflicting with issues in the public

supra note 1, at 275-82, 422-24, 517-21.
205. See TOCQUEVILLE,
206. See id. at 275-77; PIERSON,supra note 32, at 68-69, 72-73, 137-38, 155-56, 298-300.
supra note 1, at 283-86; 423-24.
207. TOCQUEVILLE,
208. Id. at 423.
supra note
209. On these political movements stimulated by the Second Great Awakening, see SELLERS,
48, at 259-68.
210. On anti-catholic sentiments in America of the 1830s, see id. at 387, 390-91, 393.
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sphere was simply never a problem or significant constitutional issue in Tocqueville's
analysis. 211
Tocqueville also appears to have been attracted by a second religious concept as
well-that of civil religion. This concept, first defined by one of Tocqueville's
mentors, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 212 is that a government's legitimacy is enhanced by
a widely-shared public belief-or profession of faith-that a "beneficent Divinity"
oversees civil government, punishes the wicked, enforces the sanctity of the social
contract and the laws, and rejects religious intolerance that makes civil government·
more difficult in a diverse society. 213 This public or civil religion is a different
phenomenon from private religion-it is less dogmatic, more general, and aimed at
political and civil life rather than an individual's salvation. Such a public or civil
religion, Rousseau believed, was necessary to educate the public in the virtues of
republican or democratic citizenship. Indeed, Rousseau thought this idea so important
to good government that he advocated imposing civil religion by coercion against any
competing private religions. 214 Tocqueville did not follow Rousseau in advocating
civil religion by coercion, nor did he even employ the term "civil religion." But he did
consider religion to be a political institution and emphasized that the democratic and
republican nature of Christianity in America supported a government devoted to the
liberty and equality of individuals. 215 He also commended political leaders to promote
religion and teach citizens to "know, love and respect religious morality," especially
by setting a good example in acting "every day as if they themselves believed" in "the
immortality of the soul" and by "conforming scrupulously to religious morality in great
affairs." 216
The traditions of such a civil religion have continued from the 1830s until today,
especially in terms of the implicit requirement that American politicians display some
kind of personal religious belief as a necessary credential or condition for election to
public office. 217 But the civil religion in Tocqueville's idealized view of American
religion in the 1830s has turned into or been largely displaced by a kind of political
religion in the modem era-where politically oriented religious leaders are willing
participants in the political arena on issues that range from abortion to homosexuality
to the death penalty, where religious leaders and believers invite or even demand
satisfaction from politicians on specific political positions, and where politicians feel
obligated to appeal in explicit, dogmatic terms to their religious bases. 218 As with

211. See supra text accompanying notes 85-96.
212. On Rousseau's general influence upon Tocqueville's political thought, see Mansfield & Winthrop,
supra note 2, at xxxvi-xxxix; WOLIN,supra note 3, at 171-72; Wilhelm Hennis, In Search of the "New
Science of Politics, " in INTERPRETING
TOCQUEVILLE'S
DEMOCRACY
INAMERICA
27, 40-48 {Ken Masugi
ed., 1991).
213. See JEAN-JACQUES
ROUSSEAU,
THE SOCIALCONTRACT186-87 (Maurice Cranston ed., Penguin
Books 1968)( 1762).
214. See id.; CRISTI,supra note 203, at 17-30.
215. See TOCQUEVILLE,
supra note 1, at 275-77; CRISTI,supra note 203, at 81-83.
216. See TOCQUEVILLE,
supra note I, at 521.
217. See Robert N. Bellah, Civil Religion in America, in RELIGION
INAMERICA
{William G. McLaughlin
& Robert N. Bellah eds., 1968); Billings & Scott, supra note 203.
218. See, e.g., Frank Bruni, Vatican Exhorts Legislators to Reject Same-Sex Unions, N.Y. TIMEs,Aug.
1, 2003, at A I; Kerry, Candidate and Catholic, Creates Uneasinessfor Church, N. Y. TIMES,Apr. 1, 2004,
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Tocqueville's analysis of private religions, his concept of civil religion and its
relationship to American democracy needs questioning and reconstruction if it is to be
a useful and attractive concept for contemporary constitutional law.
How should American constitutional law treat the modem tum to political
religion? Should all religious views and votes be counted equally with the views and
votes of others in determining public regulations, operating public programs, and
making judicial decisions, as some would maintain? Or should only public reasons
that are accessible to all persons be recognized in the construction oflaw? Or should
some middle ground be sought and maintained? 219
Tocqueville's perspective on democracy, religion, and the relationships between
them suggests three overlapping principles. First, the general moral support that
private religion can provide to a democracy suggests that constitutional law (and
political discourse) should not be employed to discourage citizens, voters, and
legislators from expressing and voting upon their religious convictions to the extent
they wish to do so. 220 In Michael Perry's words, we should in general be
"inclusionists" rather than "exclusionists" or "agnostics" with regard to the expression
ofreligious discourse in the public sphere, 221 and both the speech and religion clauses
of the First Amendment would seem to demand nothing less. But this is not to say, as
some would, that government officials, legislators, or judges should be able to justify
any official action by relying on their religious convictions. For religious convictions,
like any other kind of conviction, should have to withstand not only the majoritarian
process of legislatures but also the constitutional process of judicial review in the
courts. If the expression of religious convictions for particular government actions is
merely evidence of the imposition of majority religious convictions upon others, such
expressions may constitute evidence of an Establishment Clause violation. 222 Or if
such expressions are only evidence of the imposition of majority moral views upon
others, these expressions may constitute evidence of due process or equal protection
violations. 223 In other words, in the Tocquevillian perspective, religious views in
constitutional law do not deserve more protection or more judicial deference than other
moral views that are simply part of a conformity-inducing majority public opinion.

at A 1 (reporting on a task force of American bishops considering guidelines on relations with Catholic
politicians, Catholic criticisms of John Kerry for voting for abortion rights, and the refusal by the
Archbishop of St. Louis to offer communion to John Kerry); Bishop Would Deny Rite for Defiant Catholic
Voters, N.Y. TIMES,May 14, 2004, at Al 6. See also CRISTI,supra note 203, at 187-221; Billings & Scott,
supra note 203 (both describing civil and political religion in contemporary America).
219. Compare GREEN
AwALT,supra note 149 (advocating an expansive reception ofreligious convictions
in politics and law), with JOHNRAWLS,POLITICAL
LIBERALISM
(1996) (arguing that politics and law should
be based only on public reasons).
220. See GREENAWALT,
supra note 149; PERRY,supra note 204. Cf Philip C. Kissam, Let's Bring
Religion into the Public Schools and Respect the Religion Clauses, 49 U. KAN. L. REv. 593 (2001)
(proposing ways in which religious discussions might be brought more fully into public schools, including
the curriculum, without violating either the Free Exercise or Establishment Clauses).
221. See PERRY,supra note 204, at ix-x, 35-44 (supporting inclusion of religious ideals in political
discourse).
222. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 592-93 (1987); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 51-52
(1985); Loewy, supra note 149.
223. See supra Part III.
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Second, Tocqueville's perspective on religion and democracy would surely
disfavor discriminating between religious expressions and convictions, on the one
hand, and secular expressions and convictions on the other. For one thing, as just
indicated, religious and secular moral convictions that support government actions
should be treated the same way, included in our political discourse but incapable of
justifying laws that merely impose majority moral views upon other persons.
Conversely, individuals wishing to pursue religious beliefs and interests in the course
of their education or other public programs should not be denied public funding when
other individuals qualify for funding to support their pursuit of equivalent secular
beliefs and interests. 224 To be sure, the Supreme Court recently upheld a state's denial
of public funding to a graduate theology student under the state's establishment
clause. 225 But this decision can be justified not only by the federalism principle of state
sovereignty, as expressed in a state's constitution, but also by the more specific
distinction between a student pursuing her own religious beliefs and interests and a
government's determination that a particular pursuit is likely to support the
institutional practice of religion. 226 Prohibiting government support, legal and
financial, for organized religious practices was a core concern of the Establishment
Clause, 227 and this is also a basic idea that underlies Tocqueville's endorsement ofa
general separation between church and state.228
Third, with religious expressions protected and encouraged by the first two
principles, the third principle sets a contrary course by turning analysis towards a
consideration of the "mild despotism" of majority opinions in American democracy
that encourage conformity. Although these opinions, when nothing more, are simply
a discouraging feature of American democracy, when such opinions, religious and/or
secular, constitute the effective justification for conformity-inducing laws, the laws
should be invalidated as violations of the Due Process, Equal Protection or
Establishment Clauses. 229 Political religionists will of course argue that such decisions
discourage or discriminate against religious expression and convictions by overturning
their effects. But this ignores the special circumstance where opinion and morality are
used asymmetrically to seize government power and enforce upon others conformity
to the moral views of the majority. Tocqueville's democracy would guard against this
possibility.

224. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (no Establishment Clause violation by the
public provision of vouchers for private religious schools where vouchers are provided for public schools
and other private schools); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (no
Establishment Clause violation by including a student religious publication in a publicly-funded student
activities program).
225. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
226. See id at 719.
227. See, e.g .• LEONARDw.LEVY, THEEsTABLISHMENTCLAUSE:RELIGIONANDTHE FIRSTAMENDMENT
89, 95-97, 175 (1986).
228. See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note I, at 282-88.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 142-161.
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VI. DEMOCRACY AND CIVIC ASSOCIATIONS
Tocqueville also admired American civil society, or the role that private and civic
associations play in promoting democratic politics and economic prosperity. Narrowly
defined, civic associations may be thought of as non-economic organizations such as
churches, reform societies, cultural organizations, amateur sports organizations and ad
hoc groups that assemble to accomplish specific projects. 230 But Tocqueville did not
distinguish between non-economic and economic private organizations in his praise
for how private initiative and private diversity was encouraged by American
democracy, especially local governments, and enhanced the success and prosperity of
both American politics and the American economy. The proliferating civic
associations in America, in Tocqueville's view, complemented or supplemented
government actions (thus limiting the need for government actions and spending),
helped guard against abuses of government power (particularly by the means of a
diffuse critical press), powered the American economy, softened the harshness of
market calculations by business and the people who managed and worked within these
businesses (this was a particular value of religion), and enriched the lives of
individuals by providing spiritual benefits, diverse activities, and outlets for
cooperating with others in performing socially valuable acts. 231
Tocqueville only alluded generally to the constitutional implications that arise
from the value of civic associations. He recognized the American press as a "free
press" by comparison to the European media of the times, 232 but regulations of the
press were not an issue during the early years of the American republic apart from the
Alien and Sedition Act controversies in the late 1790s which Tocqueville did not
consider. He also recognized in a general way and approved of the role oflawyers and
the American judiciary in protecting property and contract rights from unreasonable
majoritarian regulations. 233 But the more specific constitutional implications of
Tocqueville's perspective on civic associations, like his views on constitutional
interpretation and individuals rights, must be drawn out or pieced together from
different aspects of his analysis.
Tocqueville' s analysis certainly justifies careful judicial protection under the free
speech clauses of the many kinds of "political speech" that can be critical of
government, and this is what the modem Supreme Court has in the main aimed to
provide. 234 Yet the American media today is no longer as decentralized as the
localized printing press of the 1830s, and it purveys its messages by the suasive,
diffuse, and fragmented forms of television, radio, and the Internet in addition to the

230. See ROBERTPUTNAM,BOWLING
ALONE48-64 (2000).
231. See TOCQUEVILLE,
supra note I, at 172-80, 489-500.
232. Tocqueville noted that the American press by the 1830s was extremely decentralized by comparison
to the European press, in part because the decentralization of American government invited or required local
commentary on local government business, and that the American press was much more valuable for its
negative or critical commentary on government actions than for its positive commentary on social mores
which tended to reinforce the mild despotism of majority opinions in American democracy. See id. at I 7280.
233. See id. at 93-98, 130-38, 251-58.
234. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
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printed word. 235 As Neil Postman has argued, the "telegraphic revolution" which
started in the 1840s, and then the photograph, the radio, the phonograph, and
ultimately television have transformed public discourse--taking it from a
''typographic" focus upon the systematic or sustained presentation of information and
ideas upon which a reader can act (in local government for example) and transforming
it into a very fragmented, visually oriented form of entertainment that acts upon
passive viewers who perceive or have no or few opportunities for responsive actions. 236
Furthermore, the capitalist development of the media since Tocqueville's time has restructured the media into large, profit-sensitive bureaucracies with considerable market
power and many motivations to please mass popular audiences, corporate advertisers,
and policy-makers. 237
The rough equality of conditions that might have existed among speakers, writers,
listeners, and readers in the public discourse ofTocqueville 's America surely no longer
exists, and yet the modern conditions of powerful media monopolies and the influence
of money on public discourse have in general not been recognized by contemporary
free speech jurisprudence. Constitutional rights to political speech in the media have
been prescribed by narrowly drawn statutes and disfavored in significant cases that,
if otherwise decided, could have led to greater equality of conditions among opposing
sides in political issues and campaigns. 238 The Supreme Court's general protection of
money as speech ever since its 1976 decision in Buckley v. Valeo239 has gutted major
campaign finance regulations and hardly seems designed to promote an equality of
conditions in modern American politics. 24 ° Furthermore, both commercial advertising

235. See JAMESFALLOWS,BREAKINGTHENEWS:How THEMEDIAUNDERMINE
AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY
47-73 (1996); NEIL POSTMAN,AMUSINGOURSELVES
TO DEATH:PliBLICDISCOURSE
INTHEAGE OF SHOW
BUSINESS35-42 (1985).
236. See POSTMAN,supra note 235, at 64-80. Perhaps the Internet may transform public discourse once
again, and a typographic focus in internet communications certainly seems possible. On the other hand,
Internet communications with a typographic focus require hard work to produce and to consume, and the
power of the televisual revolution may still dominate this new forum ultimately.
237. See generally J. FALLOWS,supra note 235; Randall P. Bezanson, The New Business of News, 28
HUM.RTS. 20 (2001).
238. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (invalidating a state law that
required newspapers to give free reply space to political candidates whom they had attacked in their
columns); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (1973)
(holding no general constitutional right of access to the airwaves beyond narrowly defined rights of reply
to personal attacks and political columns as prescribed by statute or administrative regulation); Syracuse
Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (upholding the FCC's 1987 decision to repeal
the "fairness doctrine," a requirement that broadcasters give fair coverage to both sides of public issues that
was endorsed by the Supreme Court in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,369 (1969)). See
generally JOHN E. NOWAK& RONALDD. ROTUNDA,CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 1188-1204 (7th ed. 2004)
(surveying free speech rights of access jurisprudence).
239. 424 U.S. l (1976).
240. See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, Toward a Democracy-Centered Reading of the First Amendment, 93 Nw.
U. L. REV.1055, l 055-56 (1999). For discussion of particular instances where Buckley v. Valeo has vitiated
campaign finance reforms, see Christopher J. Ayers, Comment, Perry v. Bartlett: A Preliminary Test for
Campaign Finance Reform, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1788 (2001); Matthew S. Crisimagna, Note, The Narrow
Application o/Buckley v. Valeo: Is Campaign Finance Reform Possible in the Eighth Circuit? 64 Mo. L.
REV. 437 (1999); Nathan Huff, Note, Landell v. Sorrell: Lessons Learned from Vermont's Pending
Challenge to Buckley v. Valeo, 53 CATH.U. L. REV.239 (2003). The Supreme Court's recent decision in
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission (540 U.S. 93 (2003), applied the doctrines of Buckley v. Valeo
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and pornography are obtaining substantial First Amendment protection today, where
again the power of persuasive visual images may have particularly anti-democratic
effects upon largely passive audiences. 241 In a Tocquevillian perspective, these various
kinds of constitutionally protected speech and rejections of Constitutional rights for a
more equal public discourse appear to allow imbalances of power that seem likely to
promote the mild despotism of majority opinions and unlikely to promote a greater
equality of conditions in contemporary America.
The disappearance of an even rough equality of conditions in the American
economy since the 1830s also suggests that Tocqueville's general approval of
protecting property rights against majoritarian legislation should not be applied in a
straightforward manner to constitutional law. To be sure, government regulations or
regulators may at times treat individual property owners or small businesses unfairly
in the rush to achieve public purposes with limited budgets, and the courts may be
justified in striking down such actions. 242 But the modern rule that courts should defer
to policy judgments by legislatures and administrative agencies as long as their
economic regulations are rationally related to a legitimate government purpose 243
seems sound in the Tocquevillian perspective. In view of the substantial and
increasing inequalities of economic power in contemporary America, providing
legislative and administrative bodies with ample discretion to act in ways that just
might mitigate some of these inequalities and promote some kind of equality of
conditions would be to promote Tocqueville's conception of democracy.
Regarding civic associations more narrowly, how should modem constitutional
law treat the constitutional rights of associations such as the Boy Scouts 244 or parade
organizations which are subject to complaints under anti-discrimination laws for
excluding particular groups? 245 In his article on Tocqueville and the Rehnquist Court,
John McGinnis suggests that Tocqueville's appreciation of diverse local norms
generated by autonomous civic associations helps to explain and justify the Court's
recognition of First Amendment freedom of association expressive rights that protect
such associations from anti-discrimination laws. 246 But McGinnis's argument lifts
Tocqueville's praise of civic associations quite out of context and disregards the

somewhat leniently in upholding the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, and this decision possibly
represents a recognition by some Supreme Court Justices that there is a constitutional need to allow more
effective legislative regulations to promote equality in voting.
241. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm. of N. Y., 447 U.S. S57 (1980)
(prescribing a general intermediate scrutiny rule for protecting commercial speech against government
regulations); Am. Booksellers Ass'n Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 198S) (protecting pornography).
For critiques of these decisions, see Jeffrey L. Harrison, Public Utilities in the Marketplace of Ideas: A
Fairness Solution for a Competitive Imbalance, 1982 WISC.L. REV.43 (1982); Steven Shiffrin, The First
Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away From a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U.
L. REV.1212 ( 1983); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography as Defamation and Discrimination, 71 B .. U.
L. REV.793 (1991).
242. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, SOS U.S.
1003 (1992).
243. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); United States v. Carotene
Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
244. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
24S. See Hurley v. lrish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., SIS U.S. S57 (1995).
246. See McGinnis, supra note 4, at 526-43.
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inequality of conditions that seems to affect many non-profit civic associations today
just as much as private economic organizations. His argument ignores the context and
premise for praising American civic associations in the 1830s -the rough equality of
conditions among Americans of the time which manifested itself in many diverse,
pluralistic, and localized civic associations in which many citizens participated in cooperative and democratic ventures. McGinnis' s argument thus ignores the transformation of American civic associations since that time, first into the large face-to-face
membership organizations of the early 20th century, like the Boy Scouts and League
of Women Voters, and then into our many modem subscription organizations that are
run by managers, oriented towards lobbying governments, and where dues are paid by
members, some letters or emails are perhaps written, and members are expected to do
little else. 247 Certainly some of these organizations, especially large membership
organizations like the Boy Scouts and St. Patrick's Day parade organizations in large
cities, appear to wield a kind of monopoly power over particular cultural activities that
many Americans desire. 248 These organizations also benefit substantially from
government support-not only in terms of municipal willingness to support large-scale
parade organizations but more generally in terms of tax benefits for donors to civic
associations and the provision of the free use of many public facilities. Such civic
associations, far removed from Tocqueville's conception, would seem to constitute a
particular kind of public utility. It thus seems reasonable from a Tocquevillian
perspective to allow the application of anti-discrimination laws and broaden the
democratic possibilities for individuals to participate and express themselves within
the cultural activities that are promoted by these very public kinds of organizations.
VII.

DEMOCRACY AND ORIGINALIST CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY

Originalist constitutional theory, or the idea that constitutional law should stick
closely to the original meanings of the constitutional text, has become popular today
among both judges and many constitutional scholars. 249 The impact of this theory can
be found in numerous decisions of the Rehnquist Court. It is manifest, for example,
in the Court's recent decisions that have protected state governments from federal
regulations, 250 limited national regulations under the commerce power by the principle
that traditional areas of state regulatory functions should be respected, 251 and limited
the constitutional right to privacy under the 14th Amendment's due process clause. 252
These decisions and others can also be justified by arguments that somewhat resemble

supra note 230; SKOCPOL,supra note 66.
247. See PIJTNAM,
248. See Koppelman, supra note 172, at 27-29 (describing the power of the Boy Scouts to crush
dissenting views within the organization).
249. See supra text accompanying notes 3-11.
250. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898
(1997); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (stating that the Eleventh Amendment
prohibits Congress from authorizing certain kinds of private suits against state governments); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144 ( I 992) (stating that the federal government may not commandeer state officials
or mandate state policy decisions).
251. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
252. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); MichaelH. v. GeraldD.,491 U.S. 110 (1989);
Michael W. McConnell, The Right to Die and the Jurisprudence of Tradition, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 665
(1987).
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Tocqueville's ideas about federalism, religion, civic associations and the values of
localized social norms. 2s3 Thus the Rehnquist Court has recognized that democratic
voters deserve the opportunity to hold local officials accountable for local government
actions under our federal system; 2s4 that democratic voters deserve the opportunity to
have their representatives vote for legislation that regulates complex social/moral
issues like the right to die on the basis of majority votes and majority opinion; 2s5 that
state governments have certain traditional or core regulatory functions such as the
enforcement of basic criminal law and the provision of education that should be
protected from national regulations; 2s6 and that civic associations like the Boy Scouts
deserve constitutional protection from anti-discrimination rules. 257 Originalists might
understandably perceive close connections between these results and the political
theories of Alexis de Tocqueville about democracy in America.
For several reasons, however, these connections are misconceived. First,
originalist theory's conception of democracy as a form ofmajoritarian voting, first by
voters and then by representatives, that is limited only by "clear" and "specific" values
in the original text is much too sparse and formalistic to match Tocqueville's much
richer conception of democracy, which focuses upon both the forms of government
and underlying social conditions. Thus originalists simply ignore Tocqueville's
emphasis upon the "equality of conditions" and other social mores of Americans in the
1830s in his analysis of democracy, and they ignore too the consequences of these
social forces such as the mild despotism and tyranny of majority opinions that simply
seek to impose conformity with themselves. 2ss More generally, originalists also ignore
Tocqueville's attention to shifting historical circumstances, which would enrich our
analysis of both democracy's operations and constitutional law. Tocqueville's
conception of democracy and his method of analyzing democracy, in sum, support a
contemporary constitutional law that would be quite different from the one that
originalist theory prescribes. 2s9
Second, Tocqueville's approved theory or method ofconstitutional interpretation,
as inferred from his specific observations about constitutional law, is not at all like
originalist interpretive theory. As described above,260 Tocqueville believed that
constitutional interpretation needed to fill in "the details" under the general principles
of the constitutional text, that a shifting or flexible interpretive method was preferable
to match constitutional law with changing historical circumstances, and that
accordingly judges would have to act at times in a prudent, statesmanlike manner, to
read the social forces of democracy as it were in order to constrain and guide public
opinions in a reasonable manner. This approach to constitutional interpretation is a far
cry from what originalist constitutional theory proposes: that judges (somehow) can

253. See generally McGinnis, supra note 4.
254. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,920 (1997).
255. Cf G/ucksberg, 521 U.S. at 719.
256. Mo"ison, 529 U.S. at 617-18 (dealing with criminal law); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (dealing with
education and criminal law).
257. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 656 (2000).
258. See generally McGinnis, supra note 4.
259. See supra Parts III, IV and VI.
260. See supra text accompanying notes 128-141.
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be bound tightly by the original meanings of the constitutional text in order to allow
the majoritarian forms of government maximum opportunities to legislate as they wish.
Finally, and importantly, asking Tocqueville's fundamental questions about the
social forces of democracy in play at the time when constitutional issues must be
addressed, about the nature ofregulatory legislation and its relationship to the possible
mild despotism of majority opinions in American democracy, and about the proper
application of the subsidiarity principle in allocating powers between the national and
state governments, produces quite different results from originalist constitutional
argument. These results, I have argued, fit a richer, more attractive conception of
democracy in action, Tocqueville's conception, than the formalistic originalist
conception of providing maximum discretion for the elected or majoritarian forms of
government. In any event, theories of constitutional law and constitutional
interpretation should to an extent fit existing practices and should to an extent produce
results that comply with our substantive sense ofjustice. 261 In the end, then, this essay
invites its readers to choose between Tocquevillian and originalist conceptions of
American democracy and constitutional law.

261. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CAL.L. REv. S3S, S49-62
(1999).
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